- Introduction
This article does provide some tentative answers to these questions. However, the main purpose is to highlight some of the most problematic issues in the study of semi-presidentialism. In so doing, it is hoped that the paper will make a contribution both to the study of semi-presidentialism and to the study of institutions more generally - What is semi-presidentialism?
- three types of definitions of semipresidentialism
- The first type of definition of semi-presidentialism is one that considers only the actual powers of political actors, or, to put it another way, the relational properties of democratic regime types
- O’Neil
He states that a semi-presidential regime is one where executive power is divided between a president and a prime minister, but where the president has substantial powers. On the basis of this logic, the direct election of the president is irrelevant to the issue of whether a country should be classed as semi-presidential - The second type of definition is one that combines formal constitutional arrangements with actual powers, or, more accurately, dispositional and relational properties
- Duverger
“A political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” - This type of definition is derived from the dispositional properties of regime types alone. Without going over old ground, according to this logic a semi-presidential regime should be defined as “the situation where a popularlyelected, fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament
- What is the focus of semi-presidential studies?
- two types of dependent variable in the existing literature
- regime survival
The first type of dependent variable is where attention is focused on the collapse or survival of the democratic process itself. - A further advantage is that the method of inquiry is straightforward. The task is to
determine the statistical correlation between particular regime types and the presence of
democracy
In short, no matter how advanced the statistical technique, even assuming there is one, it becomes very difficult to disentangle the precise effect of institutions from other macro features such as national wealth, political culture, colonial heritage and so forth. - Another disadvantage is that democracy-oriented studies run the risk of introducing a further
element of selection bias into the process
Stepan and Skach (1993) often factor out OECD countries and countries that democratised before 1945. Equally, Power and Gasiorowski (1997) concentrate solely on democratic consolidation in the third world.
On the basis of their case selection, both make judgements, albeit opposite ones, about the advantages and disadvantages of particular regime types. However, clearly the case selection matters.If the analysis includes the experience of countries such as Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland and Portugal, then semi-presidentialism looks much more conducive to democracy than if the list merely contains, for example, the set of semi-presidential regimes in Africa.
The bottom line is that the study of regime types frequently takes the collapse of survival of the democratic system as the dependent variable. Whatever the advantages of such an approach, the disadvantages are also patent - regime performance
There is some evidence that the focus of the debate about regime types has changed over time. In the early years of the debate the dependent variable tended to be democratic survival or collapse. More recently, though, there has been a growing tendency to focus on governance. This point would be of little more than historiographic interest if were it not for the fact that the focus of the debate matters. The judgements made about particular regime types are likely to vary as a function of the focus of the study - What is the most appropriate explanatory variable in semi-presidential studies?
- In this context, this section suggests that writers have tended to concentrate on three such variables
- narrow institutional aspects of specific regime types
- problem
this approach does not necessarily allow these questions to be answered very satisfactorily. This is because they fail to account for the variety of political practice within the set of presidential and parliamentary regimes - wider
institutional aspects of the political systems
Overall, whether the emphasis is placed on the powers of political actors or the party system of particular countries, we are left with a much more satisfactory way of explaining why political systems operate in the way that they do than if we focus solely on the narrowly-defined constitutional situation of a given regime - general explanations of political life
- The veto players approach
The best example of this approach is the work on veto players that has been pioneered by George Tsebelis (2002). In some respects, the conclusions of this approach closely resemble those of people like Shugart, Mainwaring and Duverger in that Tsebelis is primarily concerned with powers and parties rather than the supposedly ‘essential’ characteristics of regime types. The difference lies in the foundations of the veto players approach and the claim that it is applicable to the study of institutions generally. More than that, the veto players approach has profound implications for the very study of semi-presidentialism
The main advantage of the veto players approach is that it is derived from a general theory of institutions. As such, it neatly illustrates the point that the debate about the institutional effects of regime types is indistinguishable from the more general issue of how we study political life at all
In this context, the main disadvantage, if indeed it is one, with the veto players approach is that it undermines the very subject that has been the focus of this essay: the concept of semi-presidentialism
In the language of veto players, the concept of semi-presidentialism is redundant - Conclusion
This review article has put forward four main arguments - we need to be careful how we define semi-presidentialism. More specifically, we should define the concept with reference solely to the dispositional properties of regime types. We should do so because this eliminates the subjective element in both the process of defining semipresidentialism and in the process of classifying specific countries as examples of a semi-presidential regime.
- if we have to choose, then we should focus on a governance-centred dependent variable when studying semi-presidentialism. This is because such variables allow for a more nuanced appreciation of political life. However, combining a democratic survival-focused dependent variable with a governancecentred variable is perhaps better still
- when studying semi-presidentialism we should avoid adopting an explanatory variable that is based on the basic constitutional features of regimes. Instead, we should adopt a variable that focuses on the wider institutional aspects of the political system
- we may choose not to study semipresidentialism at all. The veto players approach provides an alternative way of studying political institutions and overall may provide a more fruitful method of analysis.
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