〈社會主義的當代意涵〉許國賢

1. 前言
   本文的探討將集中在下列兩項主題： 第一，分析社會主義思潮對於資本主義所造成的嚴重的經濟不平等 所能給予的改善的參考；第二，在當代的個人與群體的關係上，社 會主義究竟能給予何種啟示
2. 資本主義與經濟不平等
   在資本主義體制底下，只 能靠出售勞動力來維生的人和有能力購買他人的勞動力的人，在若 干關鍵面向上各自有著極不相同的命運和可能性。是否擁有生產資 料（生產工具）這個面向上的不平等，在商品生產與資本的累積及 再生產的過程中，不斷產生許多讓人道主義者不忍卒睹的不平等。 當一個經濟體制結構性地使一小部分人的財富和享受建築在多數人 的物質不安穩之上，就很難不出現不平之鳴。 
1. 資本主義的改革
1. 分散股權
   就分散股權來說，隨著資本主義的日益成熟化及精緻化， 除了以物質誘因不斷激發科技的創新，並使科技創新應用於商品的 革新與改良，進而造就了驚人的消費選擇與可能性。若干產業部門 或基於爭取尖端人才的需要，或純粹出於企業主的善心，亦開始採 行員工分紅配股制度。這樣的制度雖然經常引起外資法人和散戶股 東的質疑（其理由不外乎此一制度侵蝕了市場上的股東的合法權 益，並使特定公司的每股盈餘數字成為虛胖的數字）
2. 福利國家
   從比較的角度來說，保險性質的福利國家更像是試圖以較小的代 價來維護市場經濟的主要面貌，而共享性質的福利國家則更像是試 圖以對於市場經濟的最大的容忍來向社會主義進行和平過渡
1. 保險性質的福利國家
   保險性質的福利國家當然也包含了來 自於政府稅收的對於弱勢者的補貼，但其基本精神則在於要求國民 必須在勞動能力較好的階段即透過強制保險來為可能的不幸和未來 的需要預作準備
2. 共享性質的福利國家
   共享性質的福利國家可以斯堪地那維亞國家為 代表，強調政府、資方、勞方的共同協商與市場機制的並存，並透 過高稅率來對全體國民大規模地提供各種共同必需品及補貼。無疑 地，共享性質的福利國家（亦即從子宮到墳墓）必須全面地仰賴較 高之稅率
2. 市場社會主義（market socialism）
   核心內容大體上乃是在保留自由市場之價格機制的前提 下，透過以民主方式決定的經濟計畫來節制市場力量，同時讓工資 勞動者分享其所任職之企業的股權，並對某些關鍵企業實施公有化 的社會主義模式
3. 我們或可將社會主義所要求的平等之特徵歸結如下
1. 社會主義所召喚的並不是完全沒別差別的經濟平等，而 是試圖以更實質的經濟平等（亦即提升弱勢者的經濟處境）來紓緩 嚴重的經濟不平等，從而改善此一不平等所導致的多數人的生活機 會的空洞化
2. 社會主義對於嚴重的經濟不平等的質疑與挑 戰，所試圖喚醒的是對於人類的經濟活動的通盤省思，挑明地說， 即使商品生產仍將是可預見的未來裡的經濟活動的主軸，但我們必 須嚴肅思考的是，哪些生活面向是不宜被商品化的？哪些領域是不 應全然服膺利潤法則的？資本的哪些運動方式是欠缺積極性從而是 應該被檢討的？或者說，「如何使生產係臣服於資本的利潤需求的 經濟得以被生產係臣服於需要的經濟所取代（Gorz, 1982: 122）。
3. 就長程的理想來說，社 會主義的平等觀是和某種勞動的哲學相連繫的。在商品生產的體制 下，勞動對應著一種由市場決定的價格，勞動被轉化成工資勞動， 從而一方面成為商品生命循環的一個必要環節，另一方面則是造成 貧富兩極化的直接原因。但人們在進行為資本家的利潤目標而服務 的工資勞動時（亦即，外在強制加諸的勞動），在多數的情況下可 謂很難從勞動中獲得自主的滿足感，這種勞動和勞動者自身的割裂 使得人們只能在工資勞動以外的自由時間尋求自主的可能性。
3. 個人與群體：以失業問題為切入點
1. 失業
   只有在歷史時序發展到資本主義社會之 後，失業才開始成為一個重要問題。失業意味著脫離商品生產的循 環鎖鏈，意味著勞動力處於無買主的狀態，而對工資勞動者來說， 這也代表了他唯一的維生手段的被剝奪。倘若失業者亦是一家家計 的承擔者，且亦無相當之積蓄，則其影響自是更形巨大
   失業做為貧窮的重要肇因，無疑 也隱含著失業者的能力的剝奪的危險。而一個人 的選擇及實現自己期望之生活的能力如果日趨弱化，當然是一個危 險的訊號。
2. 面對失業-資本主義與自由主義民主複合體
   資本主義與自由主義民主複合體所採取 的失業救濟等因應方案，在意圖上來說乃是希望在儘量不減縮個人 的獨立地位的情況下，讓社會起到協助弱勢個人的作用。這反映了 社會有濟助弱勢個人的義務，社會應該對弱勢個人提供救生圈，同 時，也進而要求非弱勢個人必須對其經濟自由進行一定的退讓。事 實上，從人民之開始納稅就代表了經濟自由的退讓，就表明了絕對 的經濟自由並不存在，而透過對非弱勢個人徵收較多的稅款以進行 對弱勢個人的濟助，則更進一步擴大退讓的幅度。而這些退讓乃是 集中在分配面向，亦即承認了政府得以在一定範圍裡介入經濟資源 的重分配。
3. 面對失業-社會主義
   社會主義在面對失業問題時，除了必要的福利協助外，更 重視充分就業的重要性，而和充分就業緊密相繫的就是工作權（right to work）
   社會主義不贊同只是以因應緊急狀況的方式來 面對失業問題（Gorz, 1994: 102），社會主義更著重的是失業狀態的 解除，從而使失業者脫離福利收受者的地位並以積極的身分重新回 返社會過程，故而工作權即意味著一種透過自己的勞動來確立自己 之尊嚴的權利
   一方面守住市場機制，另一方面在必要及可行的範 圍裡實施生產領域的局部的社會化，從而追求充分就業的實現（以 及節制大企業對就業條件的壟斷），乃是社會主義思潮所提出的足 堪省思之道。
4. 結語
1. 資本主義的局部社會主義化或許將是時勢之所趨。即使 資本主義的核心構件依舊存在，但對於其遊戲規則逐步 進行調整（更明確地說，進行接受社會主義的有益的啟 發的調整），亦可能使其逐漸產生更具正面意義的質變
2. 二十世紀的既存社會主義在政治上的不完備（例如缺乏 可稱道的民主過程及對於個人自由與權利的保障），並 不能做為否定社會主義的可貴理想的依據。社會主義的 強項是對於經濟生活的批判和興革主張，保險性質的福 利國家即可謂是社會主義影響下的產物（雖然其直接的 思想淵源是十九世紀末、二十世紀初的格林、霍布豪斯 等社會自由主義者），而共享性質的福利國家或範圍更 大的分配領域的社會化，亦逐漸獲得更多的重視。若從 二十世紀初開始回溯，即不難發覺社會主義思潮的長期 牽引作用。
3. 資本主義本身的運作邏輯，尤其是其所造成的嚴重的經 濟不平等，限制並壓抑了自由主義民主給予其公民的某 些許諾，這也正是資本主義與自由主義民主複合體內部 矛盾之所在。而對於嚴重的經濟不平等的質疑，正是社 會主義的出發點。儘管不同流派的社會主義對此所提出 的調解之道在程度上頗有差異，但它們共同反映的是， 貧富兩極化的社會即意味著一部分的人無法有尊嚴及有 意義地活著。而欲有效紓解貧富的兩極化及失業問題， 就必須進一步考慮生產領域的局部社會化。
4. 完全揚棄市場的社會主義是缺乏說服力的，同樣地，完 全仰賴市場機制的資本主義也將自陷泥淖。但市場可以 有許多種不同的存在面貌，而社會主義與資本主義在經 濟生活之主張上的交互交鋒，一定程度上也表明了更深 入地釐清市場的作用與侷限、市場參與者的適用規範、 市場與社會化的互補等等議題，乃是未來之要務。
5. 在個人與群體的關係上，資本主義與自由主義民主複合 體雖不樂於見到個人陷入淒苦無助的處境，但其強固的 個人主義的預設終究使其有克制社會或群體之作用的傾 向。相對地，社會主義則更傾向於開展社會或群體對於 個人的積極協助的功能。然而，這樣的差異並非不可縫 合。 

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從經濟不平等來論述社會主義能如何面對

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〈Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns〉Matthew Søberg Shugart

1. Introduction
1. Duverger’s (1980) original and influential definition
1. A president who is popularly elected
2. The president has considerable constitutional authority
3. There exists also a prime minister and cabinet, subject to the confidence of the assembly majority.
2. A ‘pure’ parliamentary democracy
1. Executive authority, consisting of a prime minister and cabinet, arises out of the legislative assembly
2. The executive is at all times subject to potential dismissal via a vote of ‘no confidence’ by a majority of the legislative assembly.
3. Presidential democracy
1. The executive is headed by a popularly elected president who serves as the ‘chief executive
2. The terms of the chief executive and the legislative assembly are fixed, and not subject to mutual confidence
3. The president names and directs the cabinet and has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority
2. Hybrids: Mirrors and Mixes
1. Pure types of executive–legislative structure and their mirror hybrids
   
2. semi-presidential system-dual executive
   One portion of this dual executive — the president — has both origin and survival separated from the assembly, while the other portion — the prime minister (and cabinet) — has its survival fused with the assembly majority. As we shall see below, semi-presidential systems vary in the origin of the prime minister, but usually involve considerable separation from the assembly in this stage.The key point is that semi-presidential systems mix elements of the two pure types for each portion of a dual executive structure.
3. institutional approach and behavioral approach
   An institutional approach defines the authority patterns of the executive and assembly and how they are constitutionally related to one another.A behavioral approach, on the other hand, focuses on extra-constitutional factors such as the party system and leadership dynamics
3. Patterns of Executive and Assembly Authority Relations: Hierarchies and Transactions
1. The basic theoretical underpinning of presidentialism has its origins in The Federalist Papers
   Madison wrote in Federalist 51, the design of government ‘consists in giving to those who administer each department (i.e. branch) the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others’
2. a neo-Madisonian
   is interested in the organization of government in terms of the hierarchical and transactional authority patterns between institutions.In a hierarchy, one institution is subordinated to another.Hierarchy is thus about vertical relationships, in that one actor is superior to another.Transactional relationships, on the other hand, are among co-equals
   
   Two institutions or actors in a transactional relationship each have independent sources of authority, and must cooperate to accomplish some task, thereby implying a horizontal juxtaposition of co-equals.The neo-Madisonian perspective, as I use it here, specifies the formal hierarchical and transactional juxtaposition of authority between constitutionally defined actors. 
4. Authority patterns in presidential and parliamentary government
   in either pure type, behavioral practice originating from the constellation of political parties may temper the institutional authority patterns
1. Hierarchical and transactional relations in the ‘pure’ forms of executive–legislative structure.
   
5. Authority patterns in semi-presidential government
1. Hierarchical and transactional relationships in the two main forms of semi-presidential systems.
   
2. subdivision
   Some presidents that appear quite powerful on paper are actually observed to exercise few powers (e.g. Austria), while others seemingly have limited formal powers, yet can be dominant political players (e.g. France). Under the rubric of semi-presidentialism, there is much variation, both institutionally and behaviorally.This is why Shugart and Carey (1992) proposed a further subdivision of the concept into premier-presidential and president-parliamentary subtypes: Under premier-presidentialism, the prime minister and cabinet are exclusively accountable to the assembly majority, while under presidentparliamentarism, the prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority.This distinction has not always been appreciated in the literature, and has been criticized on various terms by Sartori (1994a) and Siaroff (2003)
3. premier-presidential system
   The fact that a president in such a system cannot guarantee that his or her preferred cabinet can remain in place is both what separates these systems from pure presidential systems and is a feature that restricts the president’s real choice of prime-ministerial candidate to someone he expects to be able to command parliamentary support (or at least acquiescence).Once appointed then, a cabinet that enjoys parliamentary confidence is not subordinated to the president but to parliament, and thus the relationship between president and cabinet is strictly speaking transactional
1. In behavioral practice, the cabinet may be subordinated to the president if:
1. the president and the assembly majority come from the same side of an ideological divide
2. the president is the de facto head of his or her party
2. What an institutional definition allows us to recognize is that it is precisely the relationship of the president to the constellation of parties in the assembly that is critical for determining the extent of presidential dominance, given that, institutionally, a premier-presidential system subordinates the cabinet to the assembly
4. president-parliamentary system
    the president selects the cabinet and also retains the possibility of dismissal
   
   Nonetheless, these systems are semi-presidential because the assembly majority may dismiss the cabinet even if the president would prefer to retain it.Thus the president and assembly must engage in transactions, as shown in the figure, but unlike in pure presidential systems these transactions are not only over policy-making.They are ongoing transactions over the composition and direction of the cabinet, brought on by the dual accountability that defines the president-parliamentary subtype
6. Semi-Presidentialism in Practice
   Nonetheless, I hope to show that there is a clear divide between these two subtypes, and that this division has important behavioral and performance implications once we situate the formal features into the party-system constellations in which they operate.Before considering the role of parties in the behavior of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, it would be useful to consider which actual cases fall into the respective subtypes.
7. Variations among semi-presidential constitutions
   Two questions are especially critical to the differentiation of subtypes of semi-presidentialism: Whether the president has discretion to dismiss a prime minister and cabinet,and whether the assembly is restricted in voting no confidence in a cabinet.As can be seen immediately, the systems classified as premier-presidential all have an indication of ‘no’ for both of these questions. All the president-parliamentary systems have ‘yes’ to the question of dismissal by the president, though they vary on the presence of restrictions on assembly-initiated dismissal (i.e. no confidence).
8. Premier-presidential systems
1. initiative in naming a premier
    if the president does not have initiative in naming a premier, the regime is barely distinct from parliamentarism. However, even when the president has this initiative it may be almost meaningless if there is a partisan or coalitional majority that organizes the assembly.
2. dissolve the assembly
1.  the president may do so on his or her own initiative (with restrictions on frequency)
2. dissolution power can be exercised only in response to assembly behavior, that is, a vote of no confidence or failure to invest a new government.
   Presidents can be expected to exercise this authority only when they expect the voters to take their side in the disagreement and provide a fresh mandate to an assembly more sympathetic to the president than the one dissolved
3. veto power
1. Even if the president has no discretion in the forming of cabinets or the right to dissolve parliament, his or her constitutional authority can be regarded as ‘quite considerable’ in Duverger’s sense if cabinet legislation approved in parliament can be blocked by the people’s elected agent
2. Even if the veto override requires only an absolute majority (50% +1 of the total membership), the veto may result in a transactional situation that would not occur in a parliamentary system: the inability of a government to pass a law with a plurality while some parties or members either abstain or are absent from the vote
9. President-parliamentary systems
1. restrict the assembly’s right to dismiss a cabinet
   (Georgia, Russia, Taiwan, and Ukraine (1996–2005))
1. Russia
   In Russia, for example, a no-confidence vote does not have immediate effect.If it is repeated within 3 months, then the president still has a choice: accept the resignation of the cabinet and nominate a new prime minister, or retain the cabinet but call a new election (which need not be for four months).As Morgan-Jones and Schleiter (2004) observe, the Russian configuration of powers induces bargaining tied to electoral expectations, and thereby ‘reinforces the authority of the most recently elected branch of government
2. allows the president to dissolve at any time
   Namibia allows the president to dissolve at any time but places a novel negative incentive on his exercise of the right: He must stand for a new election at the same time as the new assembly elections
10. Parties, government, and opposition in the performance of semi-presidential systems
    It is clear from the foregoing overview that semi-presidentialism is not actually a coherent category to the same degree as parliamentarism or presidentialism; that is why it is useful to consider how its further subdivisions, premierpresidential and president-parliamentary, function differently.As with any regime type, interactions among political parties, as well as formal constitutional provisions, matter for system performance
11. Conclusion
    In this conclusion, I hope to sketch a rough map of where we should be going in an effort to understand this regime type.
1. comparative presidential studies should extend beyond the Americas and include post-communist and African countries and a consideration of the potential impact of various forms of cabinet responsibility for various aspects of executive–legislative bargaining.Even better, cross-national studies that include countries of different institutional configurations should structure their analysis so as to allow tests of whether semi-presidentialism makes a difference

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用新的角度詮釋半總統制，以及細論其子類型

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〈形塑中的印太：動力、論述與戰略布局〉楊昊

1. 前言
1. 就概念層次而論，「印太」至少具備三重意涵
1. 「地緣上的印太」
   這是一種以超過兩億五千萬平方公里的「海洋的聯結」來含納印度洋與 太平洋週邊國家的泛地理區域設定，進而呈現亞洲次區域體系之間的積極串連
2. 「經貿上的印太」
   這是一種區域經濟交流與貿易合作網絡的多方向 延伸，打造出具體的「市場的鏈結」
3. 「戰略上的印太」
   一方面串接地緣政治與地緣 經濟的運作迴路，同時在廣博的地緣空間裡鑲嵌主要大國的利害關係與利益競合情 勢。
2. 形構動力：雙向牽引與拉鋸角力
1. 本研究認為，「印太」一詞由地 理區域的角度來看，足以反映百年海洋貿易與交流遷徙的歷史淵源；但若以當前新地 緣政經體系與區域格局來看待印太，它可被視為是戰略現代性（strategic modernity） 的產物，並且同時受到三股力量以雙向牽引、拉鋸角力的方式來形塑。
1. 東西交錯的整合趨動力
   在歷史上，「亞洲」一詞被視為是由 外來者所定義；在近期，「印太」一詞的出現，再次反應非亞洲國家的亞太強權美國 作為關鍵棋手的新地緣政經安排。然而，隨著東南亞、東亞以及亞太的經貿整合程度 逐日提升，來自於區域內部的合作需求與制度設計所促成的綿密跨區域聯結，強化了 促進東西交錯的內部迴路
2. 南北對張的融合力
   長久以來，國際間對於「亞太」或 者是「印太」等巨型區域主義的界定，多半由北半球大國領銜發聲；就連印太一詞的 當代起源也被視為是來自歐洲，亦有一說是 1920 年代德國退休將領與地緣政治學家豪 斯霍福爾（Karl Ernst Haushofer）的主張與理念。泍隨著印度洋與太平洋等兩洋戰略地 位在全球政局中被持續強化，部分赤道大國與南半球勢力開始選擇以印太國家之姿， 具體擘劃海洋強國方略，強化自身在國際政治體系中的權重
   當印太地緣政經體系 不再只局限於北半球範圍，諸如印尼與澳洲等來自於赤道與南半球的樞紐國家（pivot states）泹的融入與參與，更將具體強化印太的主體性。
3. 開放與排他兩股意識形態的拉鋸角力
   對於積極倡議 印太戰略的美國、日本與印度而言，如何確保開放性（inclusiveness）是箇中關鍵。儘管各主要大國基於國家利益考量，對於印太自由與開放的包容性特色及定義有 不同立場，但大多意有所指地「應對」快速崛起的中國在經營傳統「勢力範圍」上的 舉措
3. 多元的論述：殊途還是同歸？
1. 日本的印太戰略
1. 2007 年 8 月 22 日
   安倍訪問印度國會的公開演說便強調印度洋與太平洋的「兩洋合流」 （confluence）主張，期待能具體促成印度、美國、澳洲與日本等民主國家在更為廣博 的亞洲架構中的具體夥伴關係。該次演講深具戰略意義，它不僅呼應「自由與繁榮之 弧」的理念，框架出新的亞洲權力政治輪廓，同時也轉換成日後安倍政府推動自由與 開放印太戰略的理念與價值基礎
2. 2013 年
   安倍於美國華府戰略與國際研究中心（Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS）的公開演講，再次確認日本在推進「以印太為 框架」、「以積極外交政策為基調」的新角色，也就是成為亞太或印太區域中的規則推 動者、全球公共財的捍衛者、以及推動理念相近國家合作的促成者。
3. 2017 年 4 月
   日本外務省國際合作局在「年度開發重點協力方針」中揭示將以更 具戰略性與效能考量的發展合作政策，被外界視為是具體展示日本「自由與開放印太 戰略」的核心論述。在戰略理念的設定上，日本的印太戰略是安倍政府的「俯瞰地球 儀外交」與「積極和平」倡議的延伸。特別在地緣設定上，它所涉及的範疇更由印度 洋與太平洋的兩洋合流，架構出亞洲與非洲兩個大陸的連動關係。日本希望透過此一 戰略來推動區域的穩定與繁榮，以推動法治（rule of law）、海事安全、以及優質基礎 建設輸出等價值的落實，轉換成對南太平洋、湄公河流域、東協、南亞以及中亞等區 域國家的實際援助計畫
4. 2017 年9 月
   安倍再度造 訪印度，並且與穆迪總理簽署了《日本－印度聯合聲明：朝向自由、開放與繁榮的印 太》（Japan-India Joint Statement: Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific），這份聲明涵蓋日本與印度的全面合作領域，將兩國的國家利益、發展利益、經貿利益以 及人民之間的休戚與共網絡關係緊密相繫
5. 2018 年 6 月 11 日
   安倍首相更表示未來 3 年將透過 「國際協力銀行」（JBIC），以進一步以 500 億美元的資金支援印太區域內的基礎建設 計畫。
2. 美國的印太戰略
1. 2017 年 10 月 18 日
   時任美國國務卿的提勒森（Rex Tillerson）於 2017 年 10 月 18 日在華府戰略與國際研究中心的演說，深具代表性。他 強調印太區域在未來一百年內仍將保持自由與開放，而此一榮景將仰賴美國與印度兩 個民主大國之間的堅強夥伴關係，協力促進區域的繁榮與安全。炂提勒森的演說也為川 普的亞洲行預先鋪陳。當川普總統在 11 月初訪問越南並參與亞太經合會非正式領袖高 峰會期間，他以即將實現「印太夢」（Indo-Pacific Dream）的主張，籲請各方共同推動 和平、繁榮與自由的印太
2. 2017 年12 月 18 日
   《美國國家安全戰略報告書》（National Security Strategy, NSS）
   文中首次述及印太一詞係置於中國與俄羅 斯對美國價值與利益的挑戰此一段落中。炃這份報告書指出「當前印太區域正陷入自由 與脅迫兩種世界秩序的競爭」，牪隨著中國在區域內的影響力日益擴散，主權受到危及 的區域國家籲請美國持續帶領各方，確立尊重主權與獨立的區域秩序
3. 2018 年 1 月 19 日
   《美國國防戰略報告書》（National Defense Strategy, NDS）
   《美國國家安 全戰略報告書》也揭示印太戰略的三項優先行動：其一，在政治上並不會排除任何國 家，強化既有聯盟與夥伴關係的承諾，並且促進與新興夥伴在尊重主權、公平與互惠 貿易、以及法治方面的合作。其二，在經濟上將鼓勵多元區域合作以確保自由與開放 的航道、促進透明的基礎建設資金供給、活絡商業、與促進爭端和平解決。其三，在 軍事與安全方面，美國也將強化軍事上的嚇阻與擊潰能力，並且深化與印太盟友與夥 伴的合作，其中包含日本、韓國、臺灣、印度、菲律賓、泰國、新加坡、越南、印尼 與馬來西亞等。
4. 2018 年 4 月 2 日
   美國國務院東亞暨太平洋事務局副助理國務卿黃之瀚（Alex N. Wong）對於印太戰略的特別簡報中，強調美國之所以特別凸顯「『自由』與『開放』 的印太戰略」有其特殊意義。首先，針對「自由」一詞，意指任何印太國家在國際上 應免於強權脅迫，可以充分依主權獨立行事；在國內層次上，自由也意味著各國在善 治（good governance）、基本權利、以及透明度與反貪腐方面能有更自由的進展。相較 之下，「開放」也有兩個層面的意義，第一個層面指的是印太區域的空中航道與海上通 道需保持開放，以保障全球經貿交通網絡的安全與穩定；第二個層面則是呼籲各方應 投入更多資源來促成開放連結與基礎建設鏈結、活絡更開放的投資機會、以及促進更開放的貿易網絡。
5. 2018 年 5 月 30 日
   美國國防部長馬蒂斯（James Mattis）宣布美 軍太平洋司令部（U.S. Pacific Command, USPACOM）正式更名為美軍印太司令部 （U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, USINDOPACOM），便是美軍在制度上因應印太戰略的自 我改造
3. 澳洲的印太戰略
1. 2016 年
   《國防白皮書》（2016 Defense White Paper），這份白皮 書源自於 2014 年的構想，希望具體設定澳洲的國防戰略，並進一步盤點國防能量與資 源。《國防白皮書》指出，印太區域的繁榮與以規則為基礎的全球秩序在過去 70 年來 係由美國所領銜；對於仰賴開放航道與多元貿易夥伴的澳洲來說，如何維持穩定與繁榮對澳洲的國家利益至關重要
2. 2017 年 11 月
   澳洲公布《外交政策白皮書》（2017 Foreign Policy White Paper）， 藉由更主動且堅定的外交政策，同時深化以規則為基礎的區域秩序，促進更安全與繁 榮的印太區域。對澳洲來說，印太區域包含「東印度洋到太平洋，銜接東南亞、印 度、北部亞洲與美國」，玭儘管與日本、美國的定義存在微妙差異，但卻具體反應出澳 洲關切的利害關係國網絡。這個區域不僅標誌著權力轉移的過程，更代表充沛的機 會
4. 印度的印太戰略
1. 2004 年
   印度政府提出的「印度海權主義」（Indian Maritime Doctrine）已經主張全球海事發展的焦點正朝印太海域轉向。印度作為海權大國，對 鄰近海域經略的淵源有超過四千年的歷史；而當代印度海權主義的轉進，更在軍事戰 略層面展示印度海軍在應對衝突與維繫和平的新角色與新能量
2. 2014 年 9 月
   印 度與日本簽署《東京宣言》（Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership），其中雙方以「戰略與全球夥伴關係」來界定兩國邦誼，並且特別 聚焦兩國如何推進在亞洲、太平洋、以及印度洋的和平、穩定與繁榮合作
3. 2018
   穆迪總理在亞洲安全高峰會中的主題演講。這場演 講的基調平穩，除了表達印度並未選邊而立，同時透過不斷重申包容性來彰顯印度期 望扮演穩定區域的大國角色。穆迪總理從海洋與文明談起，述及印度在印太區域的悠 久歷史，同時也具體揭示印度對於印太區域的經略將聚焦在經濟與國防兩大領域。他 特別強調，印太是自然形成的區域，印度不會將印太區域當成特定「戰略」或者是 「由特定成員所獨享的俱樂部」。
   這場演講也提出了印度在印太的七大願景：第一，自 由、開放以及包容性的區域；第二，東南亞是印太的中心，而東協更是印太未來的核 心；第三，從共同的繁榮與安全朝以規則為基礎的秩序演進；第四，各方在國際法的 基礎上應平等使用共享海域與空域；第五，支持開放與穩定的國際貿易建制；第六， 再次重申基礎建設連結的重要性；最後，印度希望推動的是亞洲的合作，並且避免亞 洲再度走回大國角力的對抗與衝突。皯這些願景也如實反映印度作為領導型的印太強權 將捍衛與確保的戰略利益。
4. 結語：印太的未來與對臺灣的意涵
   近年來，從日本、美國、澳洲、印度 等國對於印太區域與印太戰略論述的微妙調整，正逐漸「協調」出印太區域幾個核心 關注：海洋是重點、印度為關鍵、大國是推手、經貿與安全是核心議題、而每一個國 家都是利害關係方。
   對於同樣處於印太區域內的臺灣來說，其實早已與鄰近區域國家與理念相近國家 在經貿能量、戰略對話以及社會網絡方面建立起綿密的合作網絡。近年來，臺灣積極 推動的新南向政策（the New Southbound Policy），在具體施政計畫與旗艦計畫的推動 上，均呼應區域整體發展的繁榮、穩定與進步等價值及目標，並且希望能凸顯臺灣在 促進區域經貿鏈結與以人為中心的發展議程的具體貢獻

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〈政治知識的來源： 社經地位、傳統媒體使用與新媒體使用〉劉嘉薇

1. 研究動機與目的
1. Elwood & Leszczynski (2013) 認為，以網路為基礎的資訊 (webbased information) 影響了社會的變遷，稱之為「知識政治」 (knowledge politics)， 這意指特殊資訊的內容、代表的形式 (forms of representation) 或分析的方式 (ways of analyzing) 以及被操縱的知識 (manipulating information)，這些都是建立知識權 威的方式。而新媒體正是蒐集、證實和表現資訊的重要媒體
2. 過去研究發現，政治知識很大一部分來自於民眾的媒體使用，但因為民眾 社會經濟地位（以下簡稱「社經地位」）的差異，也造成了政治知識的差異。 當新媒體出現時，不同社經地位的民眾皆有能力使用新媒體，而在此情況下究 竟會減少或增加政治知識？或是沒有影響？這也是本研究欲探討的謎題。
2. 社經地位、傳統媒體使用、新媒體使用與政治知識
1. 政治知識的意義與測量
1. 政治知識意指民眾對於公共事務、程序及時事的瞭 解，且能正確回答與政治相關的問題
2. 社經地位與政治知識
1. 「知溝理論」(knowledge-gap theory) 的內涵說明了不同背景的民眾會具備不同的 政治知識。知溝理論是由Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien (1980: 159-170) 提出，主 要的研究問題是：訊息在不同社會階層間的傳播有何差異？以社經地位的角 度而言，教育程度、收入、職業和居住地區是社經地位差異的來源。再根據 Abramson (1983: 147-152) 的說法，社會系絡 (social context) 是影響政治態度差 異的重要原因，每位民眾都處於不同的社會系絡，因此個人背景將左右其政治 知識。
2. 研究問題和研究假設如下：
1. 研究問題一：社經地位會影響民眾的政治知識嗎？
2. 假設一：社經地位愈高的民眾，政治知識愈高。 
3. 假設一之一：年齡愈高的民眾，政治知識愈高。 
4. 假設一之二：教育程度愈高的民眾，政治知識愈高。 
5. 假設一之三：收入愈高的民眾，政治知識愈高。 
6. 假設一之四：居住在北部的民眾，政治知識較高。 
3. 傳統媒體使用與政治知識
1. 媒體暴露理論 (media exposure theory)。民眾暴露於大眾傳播媒體對於政治知識的影響，除了可以充實政治知 識 (Schramm, 1964: 127-144)，還能減少閱聽眾對事物感到複雜迷惘，愈常接近 大眾傳播媒體者，對政治知識的取得愈容易，自然擁有較正確的政治認知
2. 研究問題和研究假設如下
1. 研究問題二：「與政治和公共事務相關的」傳統媒體使用會影響民眾的政治知 識嗎？ 
2. 假設二：「與政治和公共事務相關的」傳統媒體使用愈多的民眾，政治知識愈高
4. 新媒體使用與政治知識  
1. 新媒體使用與政治知識的關聯，與傳統媒體相同嗎？新媒體包括一般的網 路和社群媒體，後者強調網路上社群成員之間的互動，前者則不強調此特性。 然而，兩者的特質卻獨立於電視和報紙之外，尤其以社群媒體更具有特色。
    社群媒體的特色在於「連鎖激化」的訊息互動，這些訊息的連鎖反應在個 人狀態、訊息回應、按「讚」、粉絲專頁、應用程式（如遊戲）、活動、外部 網站、 社群廣告等等（cacaFly團隊，2011：11-12）。這些訊息互動建立在民眾 的分享。網路行銷團隊認為，「推薦分享」帶著彰顯自己擁有多 少有價值的東西的意義，透過分享，其實潛在追求的是他人對自己的認同。
2. 研究問題和研究假設如下
1. 研究問題三：「與政治和公共事務相關的」新媒體使用會影響民眾的政治知識嗎？ 
2. 假設三：「與政治和公共事務相關的」新媒體使用愈多的民眾，政治知識愈高。 
3. 研究問題四：教育程度會中介新媒體使用對民眾政治知識的影響嗎？ 
4. 假設四：對教育程度較高者而言，新媒體使用愈多，政治知識愈高，教育程度 較低者則無此現象。
3. 研究設計
   本研究的資料來源為科技部補助的「2015臺灣傳播調查資料庫第一期第四 次調查計畫」，「臺灣傳播調查資料庫」(Taiwan Communication Survey, TCS) 五年期計畫主持人為國立政治大學張卿卿教授。本次調查以臺灣地區具有本國 國籍，設有戶籍且年齡在18歲以上的民眾（1997年12月31日以前出生）且每週 至少4天以上居住於住居地址者為母體。正式調查期間為2015年11月14日開始， 至2016年1月15日完成所有樣本回收，期間無論平日與假日均進行調查訪問。本 次調查採用分層三階段PPS抽樣法 (stratified three-stage probability proportional to size sampling)，第一階段為鄉鎮市區抽樣，第二階段為村里抽樣，第三階段為門 牌號碼抽樣，第四階段則為依據年齡進行戶中抽樣，本次調查總計完成2,002份 有效問卷。
4. 資料分析
1. 研究架構一（所有樣本） 
   
   
   
5. 結論
1. 從民眾社經地位對政治知識的影響而言，臺灣是否有「階級政治」？ 從政治知識的角度而言，答案是肯定的。我們從多項代表社經地位的因素看到政 治知識的分歧，包括年齡、教育程度、收入和居住地區，也坐實了過去知溝理論 文獻一再發現社經地位帶來的知識高低差異，時至今日，因社經地位帶來的知識 差異仍然沒有消弭。年齡愈大者、教育程度愈高者、收入愈高者，居住在北部的 民眾都如同文獻所言，獲取了更多的資源，有益於增加政治知識。其中收入是較 明顯的社經地位，也就是一般的經濟資本，收入高者，經濟資本較高，政治知識 也較高。至於教育程度高者，文化資本也較高，政治知識相對提高。居住在北部 的民眾，平均而言擁有較多的資訊管道，也是一種文化資本較高的現象。而年齡 較高者通常有較多的人脈，也能累積較多的社會資本
2. 新媒體對全體民眾的政治知識並無顯著影響，反倒是僅對教育程度高 者有所影響，亦即僅有教育程度高者會因為「觀看網路上的政治或公共事務相 關議題注意程度」提高，而提高政治知識。值得注意的是，當本研究選取低教 育程度樣本時，竟無在網路平臺上表達對政治或公共事務議題的看法，以及在 網路平臺上和朋友討論政治或公共事務話題，亦即新媒體使用雖提高了政治知 識，卻也同時擴大了高教育程度者和低教育程度者的政治知識差距

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〈華文哲學百科－阿多諾 Theodor W. Adorno〉

1. 生平與思想背景
2. 《啟蒙的辯證》與文明批判
   阿多諾的著作中，影響最為廣遠的應屬其與霍克海默合著的《啟蒙的辯證》一書。《啟蒙的辯證》主要探問的是：「為何人類並未步入一個更真實的人性的狀態，而是沈淪至一種新的野蠻？」
   《啟蒙的辯證》一書所欲指出的就是，歐洲文明的發展中，內蘊著摧毀文明的因素，而只要這些內在於啟蒙的反啟蒙因素未被闡明及克服，那麼類似的事件仍有可能在世界上任何一地再次興起。
   《啟蒙的辯證》反省的乃是歐洲文明發展的整體歷程，故其主要論題普遍被界定為一種「文明批判」。其中〈啟蒙的概念〉("Begriff der Aufklärung") 與〈奧德修斯或神話與啟蒙〉("Odysseus oder Mythos und Aufklärung") 兩篇，分別從不同角度提出對「工具理性」的批判以及對於西方「主體性」的反思，可謂此文明批判的核心。以下將分述兩文章之主要論題。
1. 工具理性與自然宰制
   《啟蒙的辯證》提出的一個極端的觀點是，此種理性運作方式並非源於資本主義社會，而是起源於人類文化之始，並可在西方文明各種不同的社會型態中看到其發展茁壯之線索。〈啟蒙的概念〉中可謂最為著名而引人思索的句子：「神話就已經是啟蒙，而啟蒙回退成神話」，便扼要地表達了他們的觀點。
   啟蒙之所以「回退成神話」，是因為啟蒙以降，日益發達的自然科學使人能掌握自然的規律，並透過可重複的技術有效運用自然資源。就啟蒙的理念而言，人類如今應能建立使自身自由的社會環境，克服自然暴力的宰制。然而現代社會所展現的實然是，那用以得出自然之可預測性及可利用性的「工具理性」早已不止被運用於掌握自然世界；人類所宰制與利用的對象已從自然延伸至人類自身。啟蒙所創造出的高效率的經濟與行政體系極盡地運用了理性，但卻是以之為工具規制與控管人類。一個以科學技術控制了自然而建立起的社會，並未使人更自由，原本是為了維護人之生命而施加於自然的宰制，如今卻被施加於人類自身；人所建的社會成了人所不能改變的「第二自然」。阿多諾與霍克海默在書中以啟蒙的「概念」為篇名，所指的便是，在歷史開展的過程中，啟蒙錯誤地界定了自身。不論科學與技術如何發達，只要人類仍被迫順從某種彷彿不可理解亦不可改變的普遍力量，理性所成就的，仍只是新型態的蒙蔽與不自由。
2. 自我犧牲與自我保存之弔詭
3. 文化工業批判
1. 文化工業之特質
1. 獲利之動機
   「文化工業」自身乃是一個由資本主義驅動而造出的、用來創造及塑造需求的體系。阿多諾認為「文化工業乃是一種對消費者的刻意整合」，消費者看似自主的選擇，自始就已經經過層層分析計算，也因此，消費者實際上絕非創造出文化工業的「主體」，而是文化工業所操控的「客體」。 市場上可見的對於文化工業產品的需求，實際上是一種被操作出來的「反作用的需求」(rückwirkendes Bedürfnis)，亦即需求會不斷地成為分類計算的根據，以可預期的方式再次被刺激引發。正因其不是自發性的、而是被操控的，所有對文化工業作品的需求，本質上不會悖逆於資本主義獲利導向的體系。
2. 標準化之產品
   文化工業既是以獲利為首要目的，其商品必須盡可能投合多數人之喜好。也因此，一切已經被市場證明為有效的因素，會構成可重複套用之公式，主導文化工業作品的製作，同時，二十世紀科學技術的發展已能使商品迅速大量複製與傳播。上述兩因素結合而造就的文化工業作品的特色是：同質大量重複所造成的「標準化」。此標準化又有著內容上與形式上的兩個面向。
1. 就內容而言，標準化指的是文化工業的產品不會在真正意義上悖逆於主流的意識形態與常俗的道德觀
   不同於藝術作品所傳達之意義，常常迫使欣賞者覺察其既有的感知經驗與想像力的侷限，文化工業產品則提供傳遞普遍容易理解的內容，其印證並強化俗見或者偏見
2. 阿多諾還指出了一種形式上的標準化，或也可將其稱之為一種標準化了的「細節」與「整體」的斷裂。由於文化工業作品看重能夠吸引、取悅消費者的效果，這使得足以達致預期效果的因素會被反覆利用。能夠造成效果的細節，遂變成如量產家具中的通用零件，可任意替換置放。由於文化工業作品中的細節沒有與作品的必然關連，這使得細節與細節之間、以及細節與整體之間的張力與內在關連性消失。作品也不再是一個傳達理念的有機的整體， 而是各個造成效果的細節的具有任意性的加總
3. 以娛樂為宰制之媒介
   阿多諾提出的一項著名論點是：「娛樂」實為工作的延長，這挑戰了我們一般以為的，「工作」與「娛樂」分屬兩個不同的領域。依阿多諾之分析，此「延長」可區分為兩個面向
1. 阿多諾提出的一個較為特殊的觀點是，文化工業產品能重複並強化一種經驗範式，其符應著資本主義所創造的異化的工作型態。表面上，個體在其閒暇的「私人」時間裡可以徹底擺脫工作，然而，文化工業的作品實際上是以另一種潛在的方式延續著對個體之規制。其原因在於，首先，標準化的文化工業產品，不論是固定可預測的戲劇情節鋪陳，或是固定的音樂曲式，儘管其內容或與工作毫無關連，但在形式上與為求效率而標準化了的工作流程其實相近：「人們尋找的是不同於其機械化工作流程的娛樂……。但同時，機械化  (Mechanisierung)  卻掌控了休閒者及其快樂，機械化是如此徹底地決定了娛樂產品的產製，使得人們經驗到的，只能是工作流程之餘像。」再者，如上所述，文化工業的作品有著「細節」與「整體」斷裂之特質，在工作中，不需要、或不被允許去建立一整全之意義關連者，在消費文化工業產品時，仍被訓練為不需要、或無法在其消費的作品中得出意義關連。
2. 除了強化同樣的經驗範式外，娛樂作為工作之延長的第二層意義是：不論是長時的工作本身對個體所造成的壓力與消耗、或是勞工在資本主義社會中始終隱然承擔的失業之風險，文化工業所提供的娛樂與享受能即時而輕便地緩解個人之無力感。也就是說，娛樂所帶來的歡快足以有效轉移或解消個體批判反抗現狀的意識，使勞工能重新回到其工作上：「被娛樂意味著同意。不必再想，而是在痛苦顯現時忘記它。……娛樂確實是逃離，但並非如其所宣稱的是逃離惡劣現實，而是逃離最後的抵抗的念頭……。」看似屬於私人領域的娛樂，實際上與工作有著共生的關係，娛樂看似彌補著個體為工作所做的犧牲，而工作犧牲換取之所得，又用以滋養娛樂產業
2. 文化工業的影響
   文化工業作品大量普及的後果是，其使社會成員心智趨於同質。這同時也就意味著，一切陌異的、未能在文化工業中被表達出來的人類經驗，將成為難以被理解、而容易被直覺地排拒的。也因此，雖然文化工業乍看之下是一個與政治無關的私人領域，但在阿多諾的思路中，文化工業卻足以毀損民主政治的基礎。因為民主社會的鞏固仰賴多元包容與相互尊重，而這需要社會成員能夠不執守自身觀點、以開放態度理解與自身相異的立場與處境。但文化工業卻是在日常生活中以潛移默化的方式，一方面強化個體順從於主流的態度，一方面弱化其經驗外在世界的能力。阿多諾的憂慮是，習慣於被動接受文化工業引導的大眾，將更容易受政治煽動與操控 ，更容易發展出排斥異己的傾向
4. 社會心理研究與《權威人格研究》
   阿多諾在社會心理學研究上最著名的貢獻，乃是他與三位美國心理學家共同主持完成的《權威人格研究》。此部著作探討當時美國社會潛在的反猶態度與對極權主義之認同。阿多諾始終認為，極權主義興起的危機並不外於民主制度之外，即便是在已經施行民主政治、宣揚民主價值的美國，也仍然有著發展出極權主義的可能性。
   三位作者在導論中所提出的首要之問題是：「如果有潛在的法西斯傾向的個體，他到底是什麼樣子？到底是什麼造就了反民主的想法？那些組構他內在的力量是什麼？ 」
1. 《權威人格研究》結合了質性與量化研究的取徑。其中既包含分析個別之訪談內容、以此作為設計問卷之參照，亦包含以兩千份問卷進行團體研究。對精神分析採開放態度，但主要為行為主義與測量理論導向的心理學家 Sanford 與 Levinson 則主導設計量表，將計畫中關於外顯與潛在之態度等理論預設，轉化為適於量化檢證的量表。在四人共同的創造合作下，最終建立出著名的 F Scale（法西斯量表），用以「測量潛在的反民主人格」
5. 道德哲學反思與「非同一」思想
1. 「錯誤的生活裡沒有對的人生」：當代道德實踐的困境
   阿多諾關於道德實踐困境的討論，顯出了他的道德哲學中的一個重要面向：即，在今日，道德哲學與社會批判是內在相連而不可分的，要探討什麼是對的行動，以及如何過一個好的人生，個體不再能僅僅依循抽象的道德準則，而是必然需要反思，他所處身之社會的構成方式，是否有可能已經根本上地阻礙或毀損了好的人生實現的可能？正因如此，阿多諾在《道德哲學的問題》講座中指出，「我們或許只能說，今日的對的生活，是以一種對……錯誤生活之抵抗的形式存在。」個人對理想生活的追尋，必須要包含對錯誤的社會的否定。將「個人如何構築好的人生」這一問題私人化、以為這僅僅關乎個人之喜好與決定，之所以是錯誤的，是因為其並未意識到，今日社會並未能允許個體有著相應之自由。
2. 「非同一哲學」：認識論式的道德哲學
1. 非同一
   「非同一」這個概念，其基本詞意顯然包含了對「同一」的否定，而在阿多諾的論述中，「同一」（不論是作為名詞或動詞）的一項基本意義是，因思維活動造成之同一：「思想意味著同一」。這指的是，思維活動需藉助概念把握對象，而使用概念意味著，我們藉由指認及凸顯個別存在者的某些特定性質，將其歸納至一範疇中
2. 「非同一思維」則是要修正這失去平衡的主客關係，使主體能帶著一種開放的態度去理解他者。對阿多諾而言，理想的主體應該是一個警醒的概念使用者，不論面對的是人，或是無語的自然，主體對他者的道德責任，包含了在使用概念與語言時，自覺到，此中可能有著自身單向施加於他者的隱微的權力，可能有著自身對差異的不包容。可以說，阿多諾欲藉著「非同一」所開展的思路，呈現一種認識論中可達致的平等且相互承認的關係。

〈What is Democratic Consolidation?〉Andreas Schedler

1. Viewpoints and Horizons
1. classification of regime families graph-ically along a one-dimensional continuum of "democraticness"
   
   
   
   
2. We might say, tentatively, that those who are concerned with democratic stability and try to avoid regressions to either [End Page 94] nondemocratic or semidemocratic regimes support "negative" notions of democratic consolidation, while those who are concerned with democratic advances and try to attain progress toward either liberal or high-quality democracy sponsor "positive" notions of democratic consolidation. In a way, this contextual and perspective-dependent approach tries to reconstruct the concept's teleological core
3. I think there is nothing inherently wrong with teleology, provided that three conditions are met:
1. we have to avoid veiling or obscuring it; hidden teleology is indeed bad teleology.
2. we have to dissociate teleology from any belief in inevitable progress: supporting some telos, some normative goal or practical task, is one matter; assuming "some kind of automatic or 'natural' progression" toward that goal is quite another
2. Avoiding Democratic Breakdown
   
1. Once a transition from authoritarian rule in a given country has reached a point where (more or less) free, fair, and competitive elections are held, democratic actors usually cannot afford to relax and enjoy the "bounded uncertainty" of democratic rule. More often than not, regime threatening "unbounded uncertainties" persist, and the democrats' fundamental concern shifts from establishing democracy's core institutions to securing what they have achieved. For these actors, consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of its breakdown to the point where they can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near (and not-so near) future
2. In accordance with its focus on the danger of coups, this first notion of democratic consolidation is concerned above all with deviant or antisystem actors who harbor antidemocratic motives 
3. Avoiding Democratic Erosion
   Many new democracies do face the threat of illegal or pseudo-legal overthrow by antidemocratic forces. But in addition to the risk of breakdown--of dramatic, sudden, and visible relapses to authoritarian rule--many new democracies have to contend with the danger of decay, of less spectacular, more incremental, and less transparent forms of regression. While the former provokes a radical discontinuity with democratic politics (leading to open authoritarianism), the latter implies a gradual corrosion leading to fuzzy semi-democracy, to a hybrid regime somewhere between liberal democracy and dictatorship
4. Completing Democracy
   Which are the basic actors, conflicts, and sites of democratic completion? It depends on the type of "electoral democracy" in place
1. there are those countries where the outgoing authoritarian regime was able to write certain non-democratic rules into the constitution. In such cases of constitutional defects, full democratization requires these formal authoritarian legacies to be removed
   
2. Another kind of semidemocracy that has raised peculiar challenges of democratic consolidationas-completion is the hegemonic-party system in crisis. The Latin American cases are (or were) Mexico and Paraguay. In essence, the problem is how to tell at what point (authoritarian) hegemonic parties have become (democratic) dominant parties. Hegemonic parties, given their reliance on state patronage, media control, repression, and ("in the last instance") electoral fraud,do not and cannot lose elections
   the constitutional legacies of military regimes as well as the structural legacies of hegemonic-party systems pose formidable "threshold problems" to democratizers
5. Deepening Democracy
   The notion of democratic consolidation just discussed--completing the democratic transition by traveling from electoral to liberal democracy--represents one progress-oriented, "positive" version of democratic consolidation. Moving further on the "continuum of democracy"--by deepening liberal democracy and pushing it closer to advanced democracy-- represents a second positive version
   Most authors who write about democratic consolidation either think about our very first notion of democratic consolidation, the stabilization of democracy, or about this last notion of democratic consolidation, the deepening of democracy. These two concepts of democratic consolidation are by far the most popular ones. In fact, the academic popularity of the former comes as no surprise. Most of Latin America's aging new democracies still have to worry about their long-term survival. As rule, however, this is no longer an immediate concern, but just one issue among many others that command political attention. Today, issues of democratic quality tend to be much more salient in everyday politics than issues of democratic survival
6. Organizing Democracy
   In an uneasy intermediate position, a "neutral" usage of democratic consolidation, which comprehends democratic consolidation as the "organization" of democracy.
   this concept of consolidation turns its attention from the procedural minima that define democratic regimes to the concrete rules and organizations that define various forms of democracy
7. Post-Transitional Blues
    the consolidation of democracy emerges as an omnibus concept, a garbage-can concept, a catch-all concept, lacking a core meaning that would unite all modes of usage. If it is indeed the case that it provides the foundation for what Schmitter has called "an embryonic subdiscipline" of political science, this discipline shares neither a substantive concern nor a methodological core. It is held together by no more than a shared domain of application. It covers all new democracies (including semidemocracies), which by definition enter the "phase of democratic consolidation" (or at least face the "problems of consolidation") as soon as they complete some sort of democratic transition. In this sense, "consolidology" is no more than a label for the study of new democracies.
8. Back to the Roots
   the concept of a "consolidated democracy" should describe a democratic regime that relevant observers expect to last well into the future--and nothing else
1.  Why should one restrict the use of "democratic consolidation" in this particular way and not another?
1. the process (and the challenge) of putting a partial, blocked, derailed, or truncated transition back on track falls within the purview of transition studies. There is no need to confuse matters and introduce another term for it. In addition, in semidemocracies which face the task of democratic completion, any talk about "the consolidation of democracy" is misleading. It suggests that a democratic regime is already in place (and only needs to be "consolidated") when in fact the issue at hand is constructing a fully democratic regime
2. the development of democracy's subsystems, collective actors, and working rules is clearly a timely and relevant topic. But confounding the consolidation of "partial regimes" with the consolidation of democracy as a whole deprives us of an important analytic distinction. It binds together by definition two things that in fact are only loosely coupled
3. the association of democratic consolidation with improvements in the quality of democracy or with democratic deepening represents the most popular "positive" notion of democratic consolidation. But it also seems to be the most problematic one
   
   if we associate democratic consolidation with democratic deepening, we get a concept of democratic consolidation that is open and boundless as well. In this sense, no democracy will ever be "fully consolidated,"

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討論Democratic Consolidation可能牽涉到的概念，以及在學術討論上應該如何使用該字彙

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偏學術界內的呼籲，叫大家把這個字弄清楚

〈三種自由觀再探〉許國賢

1. 前言
1. 消極自由（negative liberty）
   係從外在束縛、外在障礙、外在干涉的有無來理解自由，故而自由係指涉外在束縛、外在障礙、外在 干涉的免除
2. 積極自由（positive liberty）
   則從決定一個人該如何行動的內在力量來理解自由，倘若決 定一個人之行動的內在力量係其欲望，或其虛假的自我、低下的自 我，則即為不自由之人。相反地，倘若決定一個人之行動的內在力 量係其理性，或其真實的自我、高尚的自我，使其達致理性的自我 做主、理性的自我導向之狀態，方得稱為自由之人
3. 共和主義式自 由（republican liberty）
   則從一組特定的政治安排來理解自由，亦即只有存在著一種政治安排俾使公民們得以去分享統治的權力，得以去共同管理公共事務，那麼，一個人才算是自由的，自由即不受宰 制（absence of domination; not to be dominated）、不必依賴他人的 專斷的意志，即公民的自治
2. 貢斯坦論現代人的自由處境
1. 貢斯坦-古代的自由
   認為個人自由是真正的現代的自由。政 治自由是個人自由的保障，因此，政治自由乃是不可或缺的。但要 求我們這個時代的人像古代人那樣，去為了政治自由而犧牲他們整 個的個人自由，將會是使人們喪失個人自由的最確定的方法（亦即， 必然會使人們喪失個人自由），而一旦造成此一結果之後，要剝奪 他們的政治自由也就輕而易舉了
   貢斯坦也指出，古代人的自由和現代人的自由，各自面 臨了不同的危險，「古代自由的危險在於，由於人們僅僅只關注維 護他們在社會權力中的額份，因而輕忽了個人權利和享受的價值。」 （Constant, 1988: 326）相對地，現代人的自由面臨的危險則頗為不 同，「現代自由的危險則在於，由於我們沉醉於我們的私人獨立性 的享有，以及追求我們的特定的利益，因而使我們過於輕易地放棄 我們的分享政治權力的權利。」
1. 國家規模的擴大，使得現代國家 的每一個人所享有的政治重要性（political importance）相對降低
2. 奴隸制度的廢除，使得現代公民必須靠自己的雙手去營生， 從而不可能擁有類似古雅典公民所擁有的閒暇，而得以去全天候地 參與公共事務的管理
3. 商業的一個明顯特徵是，忙碌的商業 活動大大剝奪了現代人的閒暇，使現代人無力也無心再像古代人那 樣去積極過問國家大事。現代人真正關注的是他自己的事業、生活 所需和快樂。古代人的生活被各種強制性的政治職責所填滿，如果 不是這樣，古代人就會無所事事而感到苦痛，但這一類的強制性的 政治職責只會讓現代人感到困擾和疲倦
4. 「商業激發了人們 對於個人獨立性的熱愛」（Constant, 1988: 315），如果國家不橫加 干預，則商業就能有效滿足人們的需要和欲望，國家和政府如果要 插手個人事務，幾乎只會造成壞的結果。因此，體會到個人獨立性 的可貴的現代人，只希望在不受干預的情況下，以自己的方式滿足 自己的需要。
3. 共和主義對消極自由的攻錯與補充： 以史基納為焦點
1. 史基納指出，西方世界所繼承的政治理論的傳統，大致包含了 兩種截然不同的關於如何才能使我們最大程度地確保消極自由的觀 點
1. 第一種觀點主張我們必須嚴肅看待我們的權利，個人權利必須 做為可以否決一切社會責任之要求的王牌，亦即，必須在個人的周 圍建立一道權利的警戒線（a cordon of rights），並竭盡所能地擴展 這道權利的警戒線，從而擴大個人自由的範圍，俾讓每一個人可以 在其中依其意願而行動
2. 第二種觀點則是共和主義的觀點，對共 和主義理論家來說，「堅持以權利做為王牌，…簡直就宣告了我們 做為公民的腐化，同時也形同是擁抱了一種自我毀滅式的不理性。」 （Skinner, 1991: 203）相反地，「我們必須嚴肅看待我們的責任， 我們必須盡可能全心全意地履行我們的公共義務，而不是試圖擺脫 超出社會生活的最低要求之外的其他一切。」（Skinner, 1991: 203） 唯有體認到了這一點，才是政治理性（political rationality）的表現， 才足以可長可久地確保個人自由（亦即，消極自由）
2. 共和主義式自由強調的是，公民們透過分享統治的權力，以及共同參與公共事務的 管理，使自己能夠參與決定和自己有關的事，從而避免淪落到被宰 制的依賴地位。
4. 積極自由不應有其地位嗎？
1. 泰勒（Charles Taylor）
   泰勒強調，自由並不是只和外在 障礙有關，亦涉及內在障礙的問題。泰勒指出，自約翰．彌爾以降， 自由做為一種個人的獨立性（individual independence）這樣的觀點 越來越受到重視及認同，而此種觀點背後的重要假設就是每一個人 都有其獨特的自我實現的方式。如果自由也包括了一個人的自我實 現的可能性，那麼，一個人所面臨的內在障礙也可能影響一個人的 自由。這些內在障礙可能是某種虛假意識或內在恐懼，，這就可能 大大限制了他朝某方面進行自我實現的可能性，泰勒因而指出，「但 如果我們認為自由也包括自我實現的自由，或者以我們自己的方式 來完成自我實現這一類的自由，那麼很顯然地除了外在障礙之外， 某些內在的原因也可能使自我實現招致挫敗。」
2. 史基納(Skinner)
   在史基納看來，積極自由的概念最早可追溯至古希臘的道德 思想，並且係奠基在兩項預設之上。其一為我們乃是具有獨特人類 目的的道德存在，其二為人天生即是政治及社會動物，因此，我們 的目的在本質上乃是社會性的
   
   根 據積極自由的觀點，只 有我們真正從事於那些最有助於幸福 （eudaimonia）或人類繁盛的活動，我們才能算是全然或真正自由的，從而才可以說體現了我們的最深刻的人類目的
   
   而史基納又強調，共和主義式自由和積極自由的一項重大差異 是，共和主義式自由的倡導者從未主張，為了使我們成為全然自由 的人或真正自由的人，我們有義務去實現的特定的有助於幸福或人 類繁盛的目標。相反地，人的稟性各有不同，有的人志在權力與光 榮，有的人在意的是家庭和個人的職業生涯，因此，不同稟性的人 所渴盼及珍惜的乃是使各自的人生願望有機會被實現的個人自由， 對共和主義者來說，「簡言之，自由正意味著在追尋我們因緣際會 而為自己設定的各種目標的過程中，得以不受到阻撓。」
5. 消極自由之內部的與外部的輔助機制
1. 積極自由能如何豐富或深化消極自由之內涵
1. 對於消極自由的消極運用（negative exercise of negative liberty）
   人們極可能是以雖然不致傷害他人但卻明顯欠缺高尚意義 的方式去行使其消極自由，就個人面向來說，「對於消極 自由的消極運用」顯然將無助於自我道德意識之確立與提昇，閒居 為不善，久而成習，既已成習則於德性之業勢必形成窒礙。而問題 就在於，在現今的民主社會裡，如果一般人民的道德品質不佳，並 且不以此為可堪憂慮之事，就極可能造成人人依恃著他的受到保障 的（消極）自由，而只顧著營求他的諸種欲望的滿足，從而在這個 過程中使社會生活的整體畫面形同是一個個的權利的擁有者（right bearer）彼此之間的交相征伐
   如果能合理地正視個體意義下的積極自由，則即使是從個人的 角度出發（而且是出自個人的自發意願而不是借助公共權威的強 制），使更多的人樂於渴望理性的自我做主，進而展現更優雅的自 我節制，最終亦將能有益於人與人之間的良性互動。
2. 共和主義式自由能如何佐助消極自由
   共和主義式自由乃是使消極自由得以被穩固地享有的必要的政 治手段，一種以公民自身的警覺性來確保已有的政治成果的政治手 段。
3. 即使消極自由的保有是現代公民最明確的願望，然而， 個體意義下的積極自由與共和主義式自由，仍具有不容小覷的輔佐 功能。個體意義下的積極自由可以從一個人的內在性深化消極自 由，共和主義式自由則可以從實質的政治安排的面向協助鞏固消極 自由。
6. 結語
   我們則要進一步主張，為了更好地改善民主時代的自 由的處境，現代人不應該放棄三種自由中的任何一種，而是應該嚴 肅面對並珍惜這三種自由。注重共和主義式自由，才能使消極自由 更得以被有效鞏固；而重視個體意義下的積極自由，則可以從一個 人的內在性深化消極自由。消極自由當然應該被視為是追求自由之 事業的主軸，但倘若因此而忽視了其他兩種自由，將會使我們蒙受 理應可以避免的損失

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以柏林對消極自由與積極自由的討論，抨擊他對積極自由的論述，並論及積極自由與共和主義自由的參與

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帶過很多人的論述，但有點水，從積極主義的論述來看，應該可以分為個體意義、集體意義、以及鑲嵌在社會中的個人意義，這三種面向，但作者沒有深入討論，如果作者認為積極自由與共和主義自由可以輔佐消極自由，應該詳細說明這三者各自的定義，而不是僅僅把其他學者的論述撈起來打包

Human Rights－SEP

 First published Fri Feb 7, 2003; substantive revision Thu Apr 11, 2019

1. The General Idea of Human Rights
1. explain the general idea of human rights by identifying four defining features
1. Human rights are rights
   Rights focus on a freedom, protection, status, or benefit for the rightholders (Beitz 2009). The duties associated with human rights often require actions involving respect, protection, facilitation, and provision. Rights are usually mandatory in the sense of imposing duties on their addressees, but some legal human rights seem to do little more than declare high-priority goals and assign responsibility for their progressive realization.
1. A human rights advocate might wish to see human rights exist in all four way
1. a shared norm of actual human moralities
2. a justified moral norm supported by strong reasons
3. a legal right at the national level (where it might be referred to as a “civil” or “constitutional” right)
4. a legal right within international law
2. Human rights are plural
3. Human rights are universal
1.  This idea of universality needs several qualifications
1. some rights, such as the right to vote, are held only by adult citizens or residents and apply only to voting in one’s own country
2. the human right to freedom of movement may be taken away temporarily from a person who is convicted of committing a serious crime
3. some human rights treaties focus on the rights of vulnerable groups such as minorities, women, indigenous peoples, and children
4. Human rights have high-priority
2. four other features or functions that might be added
1. Should human rights be defined as inalienable?
   One who endorses both human rights and imprisonment as punishment for serious crimes must hold that people’s rights to freedom of movement can be forfeited temporarily or permanently by just convictions of serious crimes. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that human rights are very hard to lose
2. Should human rights be defined as minimal rights?
   A number of philosophers have proposed the view that human rights are minimal in the sense of not being too numerous, and not being too demanding.
   Their views suggest that human rights are—or should be—more concerned with avoiding the worst than with achieving the best
3. Should human rights be defined as always being or “mirroring” moral rights?
   Philosophers coming to human rights theory from moral philosophy sometimes assume that human rights must be, at bottom, moral rather than legal rights. There is no contradiction, however, in people saying that they believe in human rights, but only when they are legal rights at the national or international levels
4. Should human rights be defined in terms of serving some sort of political function?
   Instead of seeing human rights as grounded in some sort of independently existing moral reality, a theorist might see them as the norms of a highly useful political practice that humans have constructed or evolved. Such a view would see the idea of human rights as playing various political roles at the national and international levels and as serving thereby to protect urgent human and national interests. These political roles might include providing standards for international evaluations of how governments treat their people and specifying when use of economic sanctions or military intervention is permissible 
2. The Existence and Grounds of Human Rights
1. How Can Human Rights Exist?
1. Legal enactment at the national and international levels
   The least controversial family of human rights is civil and political rights. These rights are familiar from historic bills of rights such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) and the U.S. Bill of Rights (1791, with subsequent amendments). Contemporary sources include the first 21 Articles of the Universal Declaration, and treaties such as the European Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.
2. Attributing human rights to God’s commands
    If people do not believe in God, or in the sort of god that prescribes rights, and if you want to base human rights on theological beliefs you must persuade these people of a rights-supporting theological view. This is likely to be even harder than persuading them of human rights
3. human rights are norms found in all human moralities
   Although worldwide acceptance of human rights has been increasing rapidly in recent decades , worldwide moral unanimity about human rights does not exist. Human rights declarations and treaties are intended to change existing norms, not just describe the existing moral consensus.
2. Normative Justifications for Human Rights
1. human agency and autonomy
1. Alan Gewirth
   Alan Gewirth offered an agency-based justification for human rights. He argued that denying the value of successful agency and action is not an option for a human being; having a life requires regarding the indispensable conditions of agency and action as necessary goods. Abstractly described, these conditions of successful agency are freedom and well-being. A prudent rational agent who must have freedom and well-being will assert a “prudential right claim” to them. Having demanded that others respect her freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to recognize and respect the freedom and well-being of other persons. Since all other agents are in exactly the same position as she is of needing freedom and well-being, consistency requires her to recognize and respect their claims to freedom and well-being. She “logically must accept” that other people as agents have equal rights to freedom and well-being. These two abstract rights work alone and together to generate equal specific human rights of familiar sorts
2. Griffin
   Griffin strongly sides with those who see human rights as fundamentally moral rights. Their defining role, in Griffin’s view, is protecting people’s ability to form and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life—a capacity that Griffin variously refers to as “autonomy,” “normative agency,” and “personhood.” This ability to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of a worthwhile life is taken to be of paramount value, the exclusive source of human dignity, and thereby the basis of human rights (Griffin 2008). Griffin holds that people value this capacity “especially highly, often more highly than even their happiness.”
   Griffin’s thesis that all human rights are grounded in normative agency is put forward not so much as a description but as a proposal, as the best way of giving human rights unity, coherence, and limits
3. Political Conceptions of Human Rights
1. John Rawls
1.  the justificatory process for human rights
   These representatives are imagined to see the countries they represent as free (rightfully independent) and equal (equally worthy of respect and fair treatment). These representatives are also imagined to be choosing rationally in light of the fundamental interests of their country, to be reasonable in seeking to find and respect fair terms of cooperation, and impartial because they are behind a “veil of ignorance”—they lack information about the country they represent such as its size, wealth, and power. Rawls holds that under these conditions these representatives will unanimously choose principles for the global order that include some basic human rights
2. a limited list of human rights
   Rawls advocated a limited list of human rights, one that leaves out many fundamental freedoms, rights of political participation, and equality rights. He did this for two reasons. One is that he wanted a list that is plausible for all reasonable countries, not just liberal democracies. The second reason is that he viewed serious violations of human rights as triggering permissible intervention by other countries, and only the most important rights can play this role.
2. Charles Beitz
1. Human Rights
   Beitz suggests that we can develop an understanding of human rights by attending to “the practical inferences that would be drawn by competent participants in the practice from what they regard as valid claims of human rights.” Observations of what competent participants say and do inform the account of what human rights are. The focus is not on what human rights are at some deep philosophical level; it is rather on how they work by guiding actions within a recently emerged and still evolving discursive practice. The norms of the practice guide the interpretation and application of human rights, the appropriateness of criticism in terms of human rights, adjudication in human rights courts, and—perhaps most importantly—responding to serious violations of human rights
2. accept Human Rights
   Beitz emphasizes the practical good that human rights do, not their grounds in some underlying moral reality. This helps make human rights attractive to people from around the world with their diverse religious and philosophical traditions. The broad justification for human rights and their normativity that Beitz offers is that they protect “urgent individual interests against predictable dangers (”standard threats“) to which they are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of independent states.”
3. Which Rights are Human Rights?
1. Civil and Political Rights
   In deciding which specific rights are human rights it is possible to make either too little or too much of international documents such as the Universal Declaration and the European Convention. One makes too little of them by proceeding as if drawing up a list of important rights were a new question, never before addressed, and as if there were no practical wisdom to be found in the choices of rights that went into the historic documents. And one makes too much of them by presuming that those documents tell us everything we need to know about human rights. This approach involves a kind of fundamentalism: it holds that when a right is on the official lists of human rights that settles its status as a human right (“If it’s in the book that’s all I need to know.”) But the process of identifying human rights in the United Nations and elsewhere was a political process with plenty of imperfections. There is little reason to take international diplomats as the most authoritative guides to which human rights there are
2. Social Rights
1. Why did the Social Covenant opt for progressive implementation and thereby treat its rights as being somewhat like goals?
   The main reason is that many of the world’s countries lacked the economic, institutional, and human resources to realize these standards fully or even largely. For many countries, noncompliance due to inability would have been certain if these standards had been treated as immediately binding.
2. Do social rights yield a sufficient commitment to equality?
   A strongly egalitarian political program is best pursued partially within but mostly beyond the human rights framework. One reason for this is that the human rights movement will have better future prospects for acceptance and realization if it has widespread political support. That requires that the rights it endorses appeal to people with a variety of political views ranging from center-left to center-right
3. Do social rights protect sufficiently important human interests? 
   Consider two examples: the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to free public education. These rights require governments to try to remedy widespread and serious evils such as severe poverty, starvation and malnutrition, and ignorance. The importance of food and other basic material conditions of life is easy to show. These goods are essential to people’s ability to live, function, and flourish. Without adequate access to these goods, interests in life, health, and liberty are endangered and serious illness and death are probable. Lack of access to educational opportunities typically limits (both absolutely and comparatively) people’s abilities to participate fully and effectively in the political and economic life of their country.
4. Are social rights too burdensome?
   Countries that do not accept and implement social rights still have to bear somehow the costs of providing for the needy since these countries—particularly if they recognize democratic rights of political participation—are unlikely to find it tolerable to allow sizeable parts of the population to starve and be homeless. If government does not supply food, clothing, and shelter to those unable to provide for themselves, then families, friends, and communities will have to shoulder this burden
5. Are social rights feasible worldwide?
   Standards that outrun the abilities of many of their addressees are good candidates for treatment as goals. Viewing them as largely aspirational rather than as imposing immediate duties avoids problems of inability-based noncompliance. One may worry, however, that this is too much of a demotion for social rights because goals seem much weaker than rights. But goals can be formulated in ways that make them more like rights. They can be assigned addressees (the parties who are to pursue the goal), beneficiaries, scopes that define the objective to be pursued, and a high level of priority
3. Rights of Women, Minorities, and Groups
1. Women
    Violations of women’s human rights often occur in the home at the hands of other family members, not in the street at the hands of the police. Most violence against women occurs in the “private” sphere. This has meant that governments cannot be seen as the only addressees of human rights and that the right to privacy of home and family needs qualifications to allow police to protect women within the home.
2. Minority
   Minority groups are often targets of violence. Human rights norms call upon governments to refrain from such violence and to provide protections against it. This work is partly done by the right to life, which is a standard individual right. It is also done by the right against genocide which protects some groups from attempts to destroy or decimate them
3. the right against genocide be a human right
   This can be made more palatable, perhaps, by recognizing that the beneficiaries of the right against genocide are individual humans who enjoy greater security against attempts to destroy the group to which they belong
4. Environmental Rights
   Consider environmental rights, which are often defined to include rights of animals or even of nature itself. Conceived in this broad way environmental rights don’t have a good fit with the general idea of human rights because the rightholders are not humans or human groups.
   A justification for a human right to a safe environment should show that environmental problems pose serious threats to fundamental human interests, values, or norms; that governments may appropriately be burdened with the responsibility of protecting people against these threats; and that most governments actually have the ability to do this.
1. Steve Vanderheiden
   advocated by Steve Vanderheiden accepts the idea of a human right to an environment that is adequate for human life and health and derives from this broad right a more specific right to a stable climate
2. Simon Caney
   does not require introducing a new environmental right. It suggests instead that serious action to reduce and mitigate climate change is required by already well-established human rights because severe climate change will violate many people’s rights to life, food, and health
4. Universal Human Rights in a World of Diverse Beliefs and Practices

〈華文哲學百科－自然狀態 Naturzustand〉

1. 重要思想家對自然狀態的理解與使用
1. 湯瑪斯．霍布斯 (Thomas Hobbes)
   霍布斯是契約論最重要的代表人物。
1. 契約論的研究，通常在於回答：誰和誰，在何種條件下，基於何種動機，想要達成何種目的而締結什麼樣的契約？
1. 首先即在於分析自然狀態，透過對自然狀態的分析，才能瞭解締結契約的條件與限制。
1. 一種是自然狀態中的衝突情況，自然狀態所顯示的問題，通常即是契約論的答案。透過對自然狀態的分析，瞭解衝突的結構，有助於論點的確立。
2. 第二種是自然狀態的人類學，探討論證基礎背後的人類圖像，居住在自然狀態裡的人具有什麼樣的理性能力，對於衝突有何感受，如何成為其行動的基礎。
3. 第三種分析是針對自然狀態的規範性要素，尤其是探討如何履行契約的道德條件。不過，因為無確定的契約主體，也無解約的條件契約論仍是假設性的思考方式。
2. 其次，是分析契約本身
3. 第三是處理締結契約之後所產生的後果。
2. 霍布斯的研究結果：
   人沒有天生的資源用以成立社會，在自然狀態中不會自然而然產生社會秩序。自然狀態不是和平的、互相合作的狀態，而是衝突的、隨時有暴力、彼此不信任的狀態。人需要尋求出路，永遠地脫離這種狀態。
   依此，霍布斯的建議是：成立國家。
   基於人類尋求自保的利益，推動了秩序的需求，促使人類必須發展適合的工具，修補人類天生的缺陷
3. 霍布斯的自然狀態，預設了資源的有限性，人與人相互爭奪的，不僅是維生的資材而已，也包括權力。而即使在國家秩序中，資源也是有限的，也有可能發生衝突，差別在於自然狀態中的競爭，是以自然的暴力進行，而在國家狀態裡，是以法律作為強制。
2. 約翰．洛克 (John Locke)
   洛克的政治哲學論述，主要見於其 1690 年的《政府論》。其寫作目的，在於發展國家統治的正當性理論，並且說明國家起源、國家統治的範圍與目的。洛克設定了一些正當化的基準，他區分真正的、有正當性的，與錯誤的、非法的統治；界定了國家統治正當性的權限範圍，並且確立了國家統治正當性的目的。
   他認為，為正確理解政治權力，以及由根源處找出政治權力的基礎，必須思考人類從本以來的狀態為何？
1. 洛克的自然狀態首先由人的概念開始：「一個全然自由的狀態，人的行動受自然法則的約束，並且就像人們所希望的，擁有財產與人格，不需要得到他人的同意，或與任何人的意志有關。」
   自然狀態裡有關自由與平等的設定，並非只是單純的描述，而是法律的概念。所謂人擁有天生的自由，係指從本以來，即有不受他人意志或利益的干涉，可以處分自己本身與自己財產的權利，在自然法則的界限内自在地營生，這也同時意味著沒有人有權可以強迫其他人。所謂天生的平等，係指每個人對其他人都有相同的權利與相同的法律地位
2. 洛克也區分自然狀態與戰爭狀態，自然狀態是由人依其理性所共同成立的狀態，因而是和平安寧、富足、相互扶助的狀態。相反的，戰爭狀態是敵對的、惡的、暴力與相互毁滅的狀態。相較於霍布斯，後者設定自然狀態即是人與人戰爭的狀態，是國家成立前的人類生活處境。而洛克將國家成立前的狀態設定為自然的法律狀態。
   因此，人類的生活世界有二，一是受自然法則規範的自然狀態，個人的權利受到尊重，二是受暴力威脅，有可能毁滅的戰爭狀態
3. 洛克的自然狀態論證，帶有人類本質的分析，也就是描述性的自然狀態，而最重要的問題是，為何要離開自然狀態？
   經驗性的人類學不認為有必要論證社會生活關係的惡化。洛克以常識 (common sense) 說明人的本性，認為暴力、自私自利是使得自然狀態不再有吸引力的原因。道德的劣根性，不愛好和平、投機、自私自利、暴力的本性，將會使得自然狀態無以為繼，顯現在三方面：一是犯罪者侵犯他人之生命、身體、財產，二是因為智識的惰性而忽視或不尊重自然法則；三是為了處罰他人的逾矩，而不尋常地、不確定地實施人所擁有的權力
3. 尚－雅克．盧梭 (Jean-Jacques Rousseau)
1. 國家
   對盧梭而言，國家毋寧是富人用以自保的聯合組織，因為對他們來說，自然狀態的不穩定，本身即是很大的危害。在自然狀態中不僅欠缺充分且穩定的力量，用以分配他們的財富，他們的財富只是建立在搖晃的基礎上。
   有錢人只有透過契約才會成為強者，在自然狀態中有錢人是弱者，窮人才是強者，但窮人被狡猾的有錢人欺騙，同意永遠拿掉自己的強勢，所以才會成為社會的弱者。這樣的社會契約，随著法律規則系統的穩定成形，並且以建立國家統治為目標，是社會政治制度化以及結構化的第一階段
2. 離開自然狀態的理由
   在盧梭的理論中，則是因為在自然環境中，基於自保的風險而驅使人們締結社會契約。盧梭將契約的成立聯結到社會的形成，認為社會之所以形成，乃是因為自然狀態的不宜人居，所以人們只好相互結盟。在國家法的層次上，社會有一股引力，吸引人們成立社會，因此締結互助契約。盧梭的社會契約，在這意義上，主要不在證成國家統治，反而是在說明社會的出現。
3. 《社會契約論》
   在社會契約這本書裡，他開展規範性的設計，在依法形成的社會發展歷程中，建構國家法的基本原則，也就是人類得以共同生活的根本大法。在此契約的論證提供了探求國家法規則的架構。先前盧梭利用契約論，作為社會演化過程中逐步法律化的解釋模型，不僅所有權，也包括統治秩序也都以這個不公平的契約為基礎，現在契約論是作為正義理論的認識程序，狹義地理解即是國家法。在社會契約這本書裡的契約，不是歷史哲學的命題，因為不存在於真實的歷史中。他的契約論與熟知的霍布斯或洛克的不同之處，不在於窮人與富人，而是不確定在歷史的那個階段，以及沒有經過社會形塑的人，因無法忍受自然狀態而離開。彼此以理性的方式，為每個人的利益，並且立基於道德上允許的方式，一致地同意共存的規範。只要這樣的方式能夠改善每個人的生活條件，對每個人都有益處。只要這樣的方式不會傷害到每個人的權利，就是正當的。只要這樣的方式能夠滿足雙方的權利義務，就能滿足正義與效益。
4. 普芬多夫 (Pufendorf, 1632-1694)
   普芬多夫以幾何的方式論述自然法，並與自然法的經驗基礎相互結合，發展出新的方法論。他不僅將自然科學方法適用於他的法理論，也應用於道德哲學以及政治。他自承方法論受到霍布斯的影響極大，一如霍布斯，他的方法也是透過假設性的設定，然後重新建構現象的發生，藉此分析出基本的要素。
1. 普芬多夫將自然狀態稱為「首要之物」(prima materia)，作為建構自然法的基礎要素。藉由對自然狀態的分析，將人及其多樣龐雜的生活脈絡，化約成為本質的、永恆的「人的條件」(conditio humana)。不同時空背景下的典章制度、發明，都在自然狀態的鏡像裡，映現出人的真正本質，由此建構出普遍有效，且能順應歷史與文化變遷的自然法理論。而其所謂的自然，係指經驗性的事物，或是出生即具有的能力或愛好，尚未受到文化與訓諫 (cultura et disciplina) 影響的理想狀態。
   依其種類、對象、以及認知目的，普芬多夫再將之分為四種不同的形態
1. 原始的自然狀態」(status naturalis in se)
   原始的自然狀態立於文化與社會狀態的對立面，目的在於推導出人的本質，用以說明社會或文化是適合的狀態。由於孤立無助的個人因其天生的弱點，因此顯出社會 (socialitas) 是人類必然的選擇，同時也證明有自然法存在的必要。
2. 「有他人存在的自然狀態」(status naturalis in ordine ad alios hominess)
   在這個狀態裡，人與人之間彼此平等，互不隸屬，並無上下位階的關係。這種有人的自然狀態，可能存在於國與國之間，或是在先民時期部落或大家族彼此之間。有他人存在的自然狀態，其對人的預設不以身體上的性質為重點，也不強調有組成社會團體的必要，反而以法律關係為中心，抽離所有因實證法而造成的束縛，而由人的本質的類似性而得到法。如此的法，特徴是追求自保與免於其他人的統治支配。基於自保，人有權可以為所應為，只要對其維護生命的延續有所助益，並且不侵犯他人權利。為免於他人統治，人有權決定依循意志的決定，而選擇自保的手段，當然，在自然法則所允許的範圍之內。普芬多夫稱此種自由是自然的自由 (libertas naturalis)
3. 「真實存在的自然狀態」(status naturalis qui revera existit)
   普芬多夫將其起源溯至聖經的創世紀，上帝希望亞當掌管他的家庭。由於普芬多夫虔誠的信仰，所以這裡所稱的自然狀態並不是人類的原始狀態，而是亞當與夏娃的後代開枝散葉，分成許多不同家族之後的狀態。這個狀態有歷史發展的軌跡，一開始是人數稀少，散佈在廣袤的大地上，過著簡單的生活。後來人口逐漸增加，也伴隨著增加許多獨立自主的社會團體 (societates)，最後形成許多的主權國家，變成當代有關自然狀態的修正形式。普芬多夫認為，聖經裡因原罪而被逐出伊甸的狀態是悲慘的。只有在受到國家 (civitas) 保護的狀態才是安穩，享受一定程度的物質文明，甚至是富裕生活的狀態。
4. 「有神存在的自然狀態」(status naturalis in ordine ad deum creatorem)
   普芬多夫在此所指的狀態，是指人因上帝的意志而存在的狀態。一切直接源於上帝的施設 (imposition)，是上帝的傑作
   普芬多夫認為在這狀態裡的人，負有認識造物主的義務，並且應尊崇祂，此外，也應過著合於道德的正直生活。這種形態的自然狀態，很清楚地顯示出，社會 (socialitas) 是人類天生需求的必要基礎，也是人類基於優越的本能 (nobiliores facultates)——理性與自由的意志，而能過著社會生活的關鍵。人有認識法則的能力，受法則拘束，或因此負有義務，是來自於理性與自由意志的共同作用，顯現人的道德本質，如此才能形成共同體的生活場域。
5. 伊曼努爾．康德 (Immanuel Kant)
1. 對康德而言，原始契約的作用，是用來克服野性、無序的自由
   康德樂觀地相信社會必然的進步，在法律原則的支配下可以達到「永遠的和平」(zum eweigen Frieden)。另一方面，康德關心的，不在於建立國際秩序，反而是個人的自我立法與政治的立法。康德認為依照斷言命令所做的自我立法，如果想要有普遍性的效力，就應只是純粹的形式規定。這預設了平等，義務，或是當為的形式，也預設了自由。在這裡所指稱的主體，並不是經驗性的，人類學上的人，而是道德的人格。由於人的自律必然會要求一個外在的狀態，不受他人的干擾，享受自己的自由，追求自己的幸福，同時也不干擾別人。因此，透過原始契約證成國家狀態，其目的無非在於想要將外在關係中有所衝突的人們，依照先驗自由的理性判準，安置在對所有人都平等的強制法則中。法秩序本身不是道德的，但卻是使得每個人的道德成為可能的條件。因此，法的定義即變成是對每個人自由的限縮，依照普遍性的法則，使得他的自由與其他人的自由可以共存
2. 在康德之前的契約論者，對於國家的建立，不是基於理性法的「正義的法則」(lex iustitiae)。創建市民社會或國家，對霍布斯或洛克而言，也不是義務。康德的法哲學為國家的權威，創造了正當性的基礎，以純粹的法律理性作為效力基礎，而不是工具理性或人的自利，由理性所建立的國家較之由利益所成的國家，擁有更高的權威與尊嚴。
3. 康德認為自然狀態作為論理方法，有以下的功能：法是在自然的狀態中被考量，而不是在事實中。它證明了，從自然的狀態中走出來，並不是恣意的，而是依照法的規則必然出現的。在康德的哲學理論裡，自然狀態沒有任何經驗性與人類學上的特點，純粹只是法律理論上的建構，用以觀察法律在國家出現之前的條件，由此瞭解建立國家狀態在法律上與實際上的必然性，以及所有人必須服從公眾的法則。自然法則是一種思想的實驗，康德他的法律學說第 42 節總結：
「現在由自然狀態中的私法關係轉變成公法的要求：你應該在與其他人無可避免的關係中走出來，進入一個法律的，也就是分配正義的關係。」
6. 約翰．羅爾斯 (John Rawls)
   當代的政治哲學，其主要課題，特別是針對政治倫理，在於如何以理性化的方式，證成國家的統治行為，重點在於政治的倫理
1. 原初狀態如何確保公平的合意？因為正義的原則是在「無知的帷幕」(veil of ignorance) 遮蔽下挑選出來的。
   「這個情境最核心的特性，是沒有人可以知道他在社會中的所在、階級或地位，也不知道他擁有如何的天賦，如智力或體力。甚至假定，參與者對於善及其特殊的心理上傾向，也一無所知。正義的原則就在這無知的帷幕的遮蔽下被確立，它保證沒有人會因為天性上的偶然因素，或社會的情況而得到好處或壞處，因為所有人都處在相同的情境中，並且沒有人會想出一些原理原則，好讓他基於特殊的關係而獲得利益，所以正義的原理是公平的合意所得的結果。」
2. 羅爾斯的正義即是公平。
   正義的基本原理即在於決定社會的基本秩序，以及分配社會的基本財貨。因為它在基礎的條件或情境下具有公平的特性，並且經由理性的決定，也就是說，在相同的、公平的、理性的、以及不論個人的能力、偏好、利益、社會地位、前景，對此都一無所知的情形下，共同決定能夠最佳化分配社會基本財貨的原則。 
7. 羅伯特．諾齊克 (Robert Nozick)
1. 最好的無政府狀態
   諾齊克所謂的最好的無政府狀態，是理性所能想像的最好狀態，也是一種純粹的自然法狀態，每個人都有其權利與義務。若有人不遵守其自然法上的義務，並且侵害他人權利，被侵害者有權要求賠償，以及給予與其不法相當的刑罰。在自然狀態中也會有衝突，即使最堅定的無政府主義者也必須承認，他們主張的免於國家干預的狀態也隱含有衝突的因子，不過是可以改善的
   補救的方法是成立保護團體，但是保護團體不是由所有人成立的，否則又回到熟悉的國家契約模式了。在諾齊克的理論中，保護團體可以有很多個，當自然狀態中相互認識的人，可能是鄰居或是朋友，為彼此的保護而集結在一起，為防衞或實現權利而存在。這樣的行動在道德上是允許的，因為享有自由權的人當然可以自願設定義務，給予他人承諾，締結契約。
   更進一步，為降低維護權利所生的社會成本，開始僱佣專職人員，發展規則，審視提出的控訴與是否提供支援，如此將會鞏固保甲團練的內部。一旦發展至此，則將可能出現職業性的保護組織，較之鬆散的保甲更具優勢，必定吸引更多的個人加入，成員不斷增長。而在不斷地競爭之後，將只有少數不被淘汰者留下。到最後僅存一強大的保護團體 (dominant protective association)，將其它競爭者逐出市場
2. 國家形成理論
   諾齊克的國家形成理論，以原初狀態為基礎，個人在自然狀態中有生命、自由、財產的基本權。也有權實施自力救濟、私人的方式強制執行其自然權利。設定每個人都可做道德上必要的行為。透過成立專業的保全組織成為最小限度的國家，諾齊克接受洛克的自然法思想，發展出禁止與補償原則，即禁止無所歸屬的散兵游勇實施自力救濟的自然法權利，並且作為在自然狀態中唯一的單位可以要求那些散兵游勇不得從事危險行為。若他們在自然狀態中實施自然法所賦予的個人司法權，被認定為危險行為時，將會被這個強大的保全公司禁止。因而它具有超低限度國家的性質。
2. 結語?

〈華文哲學百科－正義 Justice〉許漢

1. 正義的概念
1. 一項行為或制度的安排 (A) 是正義的，這意味著，(1a) A 是道德上對的（或道德上被證成的），而且 (1b) A 使得每個相關的人（每個 A 的被對待者）得到應得的對待 (receive what is due to him or her)。
1. 回應式的正義觀(原始報復式的正義觀)，這有三特點
1. 這是一種回溯過去行為而有所回應的正義觀與思考方式
2. 這個回應式的正義觀適用在行為者之間，被正義邀所要求以及被正義所包護的都是行為者或有行為能力的主體
3. 正義的主體有能力理解正義概念以及一般道德要求
2. 一項行為或制度的安排 (A) 是正義的，這意味著，(2a) A 是道德上對的（或道德上被證成的），(2b) A 使得每個相關的人（每個 A 的被對待者）有權利要求得到應得的對待，而且，(2c) 有某個行為者（個人或／與社會或／與政府）承擔相應義務來保障這個基於權利之對待的落實
3. 一項行為或制度的安排 (A) 是正義的，這意味著，(3a) A 是道德上對的（或道德上被證成的），(3b) A 使得每個相關的人（每個 A 的被對待者）有權利要求得到應得的對待，(3c) 有某個行為者（個人或社會或政府）承擔相應義務來保障這個基於權利之對待的落實，而且 (3d) 對於每個人之權利的享有、保障以及擔負義務的分配是無偏的
1. 無偏
   從概念上說，一個無偏的對待排除了道德上任意 (morally arbitrary) 之因素的干擾。「道德上任意的」這是理解「一個人應得之對待」在方向上一個更實質的限定，雖然，內容上並未進一步指認。事實上，作為正義概念的表述，(3) 在內容上具有相對的中立性，意思是，權利、無偏的概念雖是道德的，但，不同甚至彼此爭議的理論都可以接受。
2. 程序正義與實質正義
1. 程序正義的意義是指一套程序決定人應得對待的正義
1. 羅爾斯 (Rawls)
1. 純粹的程序正義
   一套程序性的規定本身界定了正義，當這套程序性規定被確實遵守，所得出的結果就是公正的或正義的，不需要有獨立於這套程序規定之外的標準再來檢驗
2. 不純粹的程序正義
1. 完善的程序正義
   正義的實現不僅依賴一套程序，而且，這套程序的規則被遵守下得到的結果必須用獨立的標準來評價。當一套程序被遵循下所產生的後果保證能夠滿足或實現某個獨立於程序的標準，例如平等分配
2. 不完善的程序正義
   當一套程序是正義所要求，而這個程序及其結果又有獨立標準賴判定其正義或公平性，但，這套程序卻無法被保證會產生正義或公平的後果
2. 實質正義
   以法律為例，程序正義要求的是法律被嚴格遵守，但實質正義則優先要求法律規範本身要合乎正義。概念上說，一個專制的政府能夠實現法律程序正義的要求，尤其當法律正義是有效達成專制統治的手段時。另一方面，概念上，一個實現實質正義的社會可能忽視程序正義的要求，因為，實質正義所要求的是某特定價值所規範的個人應得對待。在實踐上，程序正義是社會正義的可靠方式或甚至是要件，一個傾向於忽視程序正義的社會，實質社會正義的實現幾乎是不可能或難以被可靠期待
3. 正義理論的方法
   一個正義理論當然對 (3) 提出其所認定為合理或正確的詮釋，而且提出所認定為合理且充份的考量與理由來支持、證成所提出的詮釋，但，一個適當的正義理論更意圖對 (3) 所指向的議題提出解決的方案，因為正義的概念之陳述不只是包含要求，更指明概念中的這些元素都是有待解決的問題
1. 問題
1. (3a) 要求，A 是道德上對的（或道德上被證成的），我們接受這個要求，可是，A 在道德上被證成的條件是什麼？
2. (3b) 要求，A 使得每個相關的人（每個 A 的被對待者）有權利要求得到應得的對待，但，這裡的權力究竟甚麼性質？是自然權利？還是法律或社會認定的權力？
3. (3c) 要求，有某個行為者（個人或社會或政府）承擔相應義務來保障這個基於權利之對待的落實，這是正義秩序之建立的問題，可是，正義秩序之建立的充分或可靠條件是什麼？這是經驗問題？或也有規範面要求？
4. (3d) 要求，對於每個人之權利的享有、保障以及擔負義務的分配是無偏的。這個無偏之要求的性質為何？是平等，還是其他，例如公平？
4. 效益主義的正義觀
   效益原則主張最大幸福是唯一且基本的規範原則，所有其他的規範都可以被化約到效益原則（如果相容），或被取消（如果衝突）
1. 效益主義面臨的很難克服的問題
1. 無法合理說明並證成正義之獨特規範性地位
2. 相關的困難是，效益主義也難以說明分配正義的概念，因為，效益主義關心的是行為／政策／制度之實踐後果是否帶來最大幸福，至於如何分配以及分配的正義問題也是次要或不重要
3. 正義概念所要求的應得之對待，一般而言，這個應得是來自於過去的努力或成就，正義就在於對一個人過去的作為給予相應的對待方式，但，效益主義是看的是將來的後果，而不在乎一個人過去的努力或成就
5. 程序正義理論的正義觀：諾齊克的歷史正義觀
   諾齊克的正義理論針對的是分配正義，關切社會分配狀態之合乎正義的條件，而他主張，一個社會分配狀態是正義的，只能由造成這個分配狀態狀態的過程是否正當來決定，而不是以獨立的標準來判定
1. 限制規範
   諾齊克的歷史正義雖是程序正義的理路，而其對於程序之設立有兩個規範
   一是他基於康德的人為目的自身的價值所設立的所謂的界線限制 (side constraints)，這限制是，他人具有不可侵犯性，尤其是在追求自己目的之實現過程中不可侵犯他人的權利 (Nozick 1974: 29-31)
   
   另一則是個人之分立 (distinctness of individuals)，諾齊克稱這是其放任自由主義之限制 (libertarian constraint) 的一部分，如此，並非任何實際的制度如法律都是歷史正義觀的程序，而是必須被這兩項規範所允許的。
2. 獨立判準的正義理論
   對於諾齊克來說，終局原則的分配或模式化的分配都是在分配，這其實是將生產與分配當成兩個分別而獨立的議題來處理，這有一個問題，那就是，對於人們的生活要維持不斷的干預，這違背了前面所說的道德限制
1. 終局原則理論 (end-state principles) 
   
   依據某種價值來評定某個分配狀態的正義與否
2. 模式化原則理論 (patterning principles)
   
   依據某種個人特質，例如智商 I.Q 的數值、個人之道德品質、努力程度等來分配，而模式化分配的正義的主張就在於，依據某種個人的特質來決定此人之應得的資源
6. 羅爾斯的純粹程序正義理路與公平正義觀
   羅爾斯公平正義觀主張，當評價一個分配狀態是否正義，個人自主當然是必須尊重，他主張，正義要求個人有不可侵犯性 (inviolability) ，但，許多社會、經濟的因素以及個人天生的能力、傾向等都影響或決定了個人自主的可能範圍，從道德觀點說，這些社會經濟與個人天生的自然因素所構成的影響是沒有正當性的偶然因素，將這些偶然因素納入一個人應得之對待的考量，這是道德上任意的。羅爾斯的理論企圖在理論建構的方法就將這些道德上偶然的、任意的因素排除。羅爾斯的正義理論是基於公平原則，他稱之為公平正義理論 (a theory of justice as fairness)，其特點是在方法論層面將道德任意的因素排除在正義原則的決定之外，使得正義概念的理論建構會是公平的。
1. 原初情境
   羅爾斯的想法是，社會中的主要政治制度、經濟制度、家庭制度等構成所謂的社會的基本結構，一個社會是否正義的關鍵在於這個社會的基本結構是否合乎正義。羅爾斯認為，規範社會之基本結構的正義原則可以用原初處境這個方法設置來說明。
   羅爾斯的正義原則一方面保障每個人享有最大城程度且與他人相容的基本自由的權利，而且，每個人都有公平的機會爭取社會上的職位，一樣重要的是，當社會經濟利益分配出現不平等時，社會中處在最不利情況的人也會接受。羅爾斯宣稱，這樣的正義原則是公平的，因為，產生公平原則的原初處境是個公平的理性決定環境
   
   羅爾斯的想法似乎是，將公平內建於方法於正義原則中，那麼，一個社會是否正義只須看其制度的設計與安排過程是否符合正義原則的要求，而不需要另外有獨立的標準來評定這個社會是否正義
   他的理論事實上首先面臨的挑戰是，為何以公平來理解正義？為何不是平等？
7. 實質正義的理路：平等主義
   平等是當代理解正義要求之應得對待的重要價值，不過，平等對待的意義仍須說明，因為，這可以是地位平等，可以是所得與財富的平等，可以是社會資源的平等，或能力的平等。
1. 一個所應得的對待是否基於比較？-非比較
1. 諾齊克的名分理論 (entitlement theory)
2. Franfurt (2015) 提出的「足夠理論」(sufficiency theory) 
   Frankfurt 主張，正義關切的是提供（分配）足夠的資源讓被貧困所折磨的人能夠脫困，而不是平等。
   Frankfurt 以足夠為標準而拒絕平等的分配正義理論面臨的問題是：足夠的標準的訂定是否可能避開任意性？其次，假使足夠的標準被滿足，社會仍然持續重分配的政策與制度（例如經濟活動社會建設稅制），在此情況，社會正義的要求與批評是比較的，平等主義者會說，這並非不合理的。另外，在正義規範適用的「資源普通缺乏」(moderate scarcity of resources) 的情況下，資源之分配如何避開比較以及平等主義的考量？
2. 實質平等
   實質平等的要求會與其他價值衝突，在羅爾斯的理論，公平性的要求是實質平等落實的要件，而前面說過，這要求消除偶然的因素所帶來不平等，例如富裕家庭對子女提供更優勢的照顧使得子女佔有社會優勢地位，這在道德上將限縮、甚至取消所謂的父母照顧子女的自然權利或自由，這是有爭議的。由此，我們簡要的說，社會實質正義的實現要求社會財富的重分配機制與規範，例如累進課稅或種課遺產稅等，以建立像公立學校、公立職業訓練班、社會救濟、全民健康保險等，這些主張與措施不僅在理論上引發爭議，在實務上也因發諸多衝突。
8. 非典型正義概念：動物正義、世代正義、疆界外（國際、全球）正義
1. 動物正義
   羅爾斯的看法不同於休謨，他認為，動物缺少他所說的「道德能力」(moral powers)：正義感以及對於善的理解；另一方面，動物無法與人一同參與「互利的合作體系」。這兩點使得保護動物不是正義關懷的主題。如果接受羅爾斯這兩個條件作為界定正義範圍的判準，那麼，動物正義的支持者基本有兩個選項：第 1 是否定羅爾斯的判準，第 2 是主張動物有道德能力，而且，動物與人進行互利的合作。第 2 個作法基本上很難或甚至不可能
2. 世代正義
   如果我們採納羅爾斯的兩項正義關懷的判準，那麼，世代正義是否成立？畢竟，尚未初生的後代並未參與社會合作，可是，將來她們出生之後將要承受上一代的所作所為的後果，不論是好是壞。在道德上，一個人不應承受他人的作為所帶來的負擔，同理，下一代不應承受不上一代所加諸與身上的負擔，畢竟那些不是他們自己所造成的。另一方面，這一代人的作為有些作為可預期的會給後代帶來不可逆或沈重負擔，道德上，這一代人對於後代有義務避免那樣的後果。如此，雖然後代不參與上一代社會合作，但前述的考量似乎也適當的指向世代正義的思考。
3. 疆界外（國際、全球）正義
   在全球化時代，國界不在如之前那般明顯作為劃分社會區隔的制度，社會合作也不明顯是以國家為範圍，如此，概念上，全球正義不同於國際正義，全球正義的行為者或行為主體不只是國家，也包括各種 NGO 以及個人，所關懷的不在是國與國之間應該如何對待的議題，更主要是世界作為一個共同合作的體系，「每一個人應該如何被對待」的規範是針對所有的行為者，而被對待者也不在以其國籍被限定。

〈華文哲學百科－權利 Rights〉許漢

1. 權利的概念
1. 霍菲爾式的權利理解
1. 要求權 (claim right)
   一個個體（自然人、法人、甚至其他個體如動物等）S 關於某事態 T 的維持或獲得擁有要求權，其意義是，必定有其他行為者 A 對於 S 關於 T 的維持或獲得擔負相關的義務或責任。 
2. 許可／自由權 (privilege right)
   一個個體（自然人或法人）S 擁有一項關於某事態或行為 T 的許可／自由權，其意義是，S 關於 T 的維持或獲得與否並不擔負任何相關的義務。
3. 支配權 (power right)
   一個個體（個人或團體或組織等）S 擁有一項關於某事態或行為 T 的支配權利，其意義是，S 有能力或力量改變自己或其他權利主體關於 T 的其他霍菲爾式的權利。
4. 豁免權 (immunity right)
   一個個體（個人或團體或組織等）S 擁有一項關於某事態或行為 T 的豁免權，其意義是，其他權利主體沒有能力改變 S 關於 T 的維持或獲得擁有其他霍菲爾式的權利。
2. 非霍菲爾式的權利理解
1. 複合權利 (complex rights or rights of the complex mode)
   Wenar (2015) 對於複合權利的型態提出一個他稱之為「分子式的權利」(molecular rights) 的分析，一項分子式的權利包括一個以上的霍菲爾式的單純權利為其「原子」，他以財產權為例來說明分子式的權利型態。例如你擁有一台筆電的財產權，這個財產權是複合的，也就是，不同單純權利之間的關係具有所謂的分子結構，他稱之為分子式的複合權利，這種型態的權利不只是由原子或單純權利組合，他將構成複合權利的單純或原子權利由所謂的第一序 (first-order) 與第二序 (second-order) 的功能區分所架構。
2. 消極與積極權利
   放任的自由主義 (libertarianism) 主張公民享有的最重要的權利是消極的，也就是，不被任何其他行為者，尤其是政府，干預或阻擾去做有權利做的事，這是所謂不被干預的權利 (rights to non-interference)。而主張人民有權利要求政府提供某些服務或有價值的東西，如基本健康醫療照護或失業救濟金，這樣的權利是積極的權利。不被傷害的權利是最明白的消極權利，而社會福利的權利（如政府應該提供全民健保或年金補貼）則是明顯的積極權利。
3. 主動與被動權利
   Jones (1993: 21) 以主動的 (active) 特性來刻畫所謂的自由權 (liberty-rights)（許可／自由權）與支配權，也就是說，權利主體可以選擇做或不做；而以被動的 (passive) 來刻畫要求權與豁免權，也就是，其他行為者被迫或被要求對要求權的主體做或不做什麼，Wenar (2015) 也提及這個區分。由此來看，一個主體擁有的權利是主動的權利，這是說，權利主體獲得資格或許可去採取行為；而，當權利主體的權利是被動的，這是說，權利主體不必做什麼，而是其他行為者應該或被要求去做或不做什麼。參考 Lyons (1970)。
2. 權利的結構與規範意義
1. 權利的結構
1. 權利主體：一項權利必然有主體，必是誰的權利
2. 權利的對象或內容：享有權利是享有可以採取某行為，例如享有言論自由權是享有（例如）在網路上發文評論的權利，或享有被保護的狀態，例如不被虐待的權利、隱私權，或保有某東西，例如財產權。這是享有權利的對象或內容
3. 權利的來源或基礎：一個權利主體享有某項權利的來源或基礎
4. 權利的規範意義或功能：一個權利主體享有一項權利的規範意義或功能，這是說，一個權利主體 S 關於某事態 T 的維持或獲得享有權利，那麼，必有權利所針對的行為者 A，使得關於 S 之 T 的維持或獲得，A 可以或應該或不應該採取某行為
2. 權利的規範意義
1. 要求權與許可權，就是否藴含相關義務來說，兩者之規範意義不同；雖然如此，要求權之主體不必具有行為能力，而許可權之主體是有相關的行為能力，否則，許可的意義是空的，因為，許可是行為之選擇，這需要行為能力，至少是行為的決定、意圖
2. 支配權與豁免權的規範意義則是以要求權與許可權來界定，如此，支配權的主體是有能力改變自己或其他個體或行為者的權利狀態，如此，支配權可以看成是比要求權、許可／自由權更高一階的權利，是主動權利。而，擁有豁免權的主體獲得保護，免於因他人的要求權而承擔義務，也免於因為他人的支配權而被改變其當時的權利與義務狀態，是被動的高一階的權利。
3. 權利理論
1. 意志或選擇理論 (will or choice theory)
   依據意志理論，一個人 A 擁有一項權利，就是，A 可以對自己的處境有一定的控制，而這樣的控制很大一部分在於有資格決定或選擇別人去做或不去做這項權利所指的事情，換個方式說，A 擁有一項權利（要求權）就是能夠控制別人是否承擔相關義務。用霍菲爾式的分析來說，意志理論對權利的主張是，一個人擁有一項權利包含兩個面向，一是擁有要求權，其次是對於相關之義務承擔者的支配權
2. 利益理論 (interest or benefit theory)
   利益理論家認為，擁有一項權利的主體是會受益於享有這項權利，因為享有權利而使得權利主體的利益得到法律或道德的保護或保障。而這樣的利益就是來自他人履行所承擔的相關義務。你擁有那台筆電的財產權，別人履行他承擔之相關義務使得你受益時，你的權利是真正的權利。在利益理論的觀點下，單純的許可權並不是真正的權利，因為，沒有任何人承擔相應的義務而使得權利主體受益。
1. 利益理論面臨一個難題，也就是，當擁有權利並不一定是提供權利主體自己之利益的保障，這尤其在權利之內容是保護其他人的利益時，這個理論上的難題更明顯。例如國防部長有權利不公開國軍軍力部署的實況，即使面對國會議員的壓力，他還是有這項權利，但，這項權利並不使他受益，不像財產權的主體因享有權利而受益。又例如，法官有權利裁判被告有罪或無罪，這項權利並非法官之利益所在
3. 意志或選擇理論與利益理論的優缺點
1. 選擇理論之批評利益理論-Hart (1982: 187-8)
   Hart 認為，A 與 B 簽訂契約，契約規定 A 有權利要求 B 有義務提供服務或利益給 C，在此情況中，享受權利的 A 並沒有受益於 B 的義務，而是 C 是受益者，可是，C 並非此項契約的權利主體。
2. 這兩種理論的爭執是仍持續存在，例如參考 Kramer et al. (1998)，而兩種理論也都有一定的直覺訴求。直覺上，擁有一項權利（尤其是要求權）的人，在這項權利所直接規範事項上，會因為這項權利而受到保障，這是利益；另一方面，直覺上，擁有權利是擁有選擇的資格，有些人認為，擁有權利必定是包含要求的資格與支配的能力。或許，如果我們接受霍菲爾式的權利分析，也接受大多數權利是複合權利，那麼，這裏的爭論可以有一些化解的空間
4. 權利間之關係：衝突與優先性
1. 「明確化主義」(specificationsm)
   依據這個主張，每一項權利應被明確化其適用情況，這個明確化的理路是以明確陳述權利之限定條件，例如，公民有抗議權，當其行動不破壞公共交通秩序，不破壞公共綠地等。當每一項權利都被明確化陳述，那麼，權利的行使都在各自的條件或領域，如此一來，權利間不會有重疊的情況，權利之間也就不會有衝突。這個理路也適合用來化解個人之間、群體之間、個人與群體之間的權利衝突，如果每一項權利都能夠適當且完整被明確化陳述適用的情況或條件。
1. 明確化的陳述涉及對於可能情況的知識（而不是猜想或假定），這顯然不可能，因為，權利之行使時的許多情況是可能的，也許有的會成為事實，也許不會，這無法在事先被得知；而且，即使每項權利可以被鉅細靡遺地明確陳述其條件或情況，這仍然無法有效幫助化解現實中的權利衝突，因為，這樣的陳述將過於繁瑣使得權利主體無法完全了解，或使得權利主體沒有時間或耐心去了解。如此，明確化的陳述會有可行性的困難，也更包括知識論上的困難，這使得權利之陳述難以避免的會包含一般而不明確的成分，或可能適用情況之陳述不完全。另外，在規範意義上，權利的一般性表述包含更多道德意涵或價值選擇，這使得權利衝突的化解不僅是知識論或制度設計的技術，更需要化解道德主張或價值選擇上的衝突。
2. 字典式的優先性原則 (lexical order of priority)
   他的理論支持某些自由權利是基本而優先，具有類似於前述 Dworkin (1984) 提出的權利具有「王牌」地位，保障公民這些基本自由權利優先於經濟權，優先於公共利益的考量，如此，當促進經濟發展、維持公共秩序是政府的權利與責任，當政府之經濟政策或公共秩序規定與個人基本自由衝突，依據羅爾斯的正義理論，個人自由權利具有字典性的優先性，如此，如果前述公民抗議權屬於基本自由權，當公民抗議權與政府維持公共秩序之權利的衝突時，羅爾斯的理論提供指導原則來化解
1. 縱使如此，如果你不贊成羅爾斯的正義理論，尤其是不贊成他的字典式的優先性原則，那麼，如何化解權利間衝突的議題還在。然而，即使你大體接受羅爾斯的理論與原則，但，羅爾斯之正義第一原則裡列舉多項基本權利，這些基本且優先的權利之間也可能有衝突，這樣的衝突如何化解？羅爾斯的理論處理自由權利優先於其他道德考量，但並未提出處理自由權利間之衝突的原則。
5. 權利之證成
1. 人性尊嚴的權利證成理路
   人性尊嚴的理路必須指明人具有什麼樣的特性或能力使得人相有獨特地位，不同理論提出不同特性如自由意志、理性、自主性或（羅爾斯所說的）正義感的能力與理解並追求美善生活的能力。人因為有前述這個特性或能力就應該被賦予權利，不因為任何其他因素或考量。這是以人之尊嚴或人之獨特地位來證成權利的理路
2. 權利作為手段的後果論證成理路
   效益主義者主張，賦予並保護人享有權利作為促成最大多數人之最大幸福（一般幸福）的最好手段，這是以權利為達成唯一有內在善之後果的最佳手段來證成權利的道德地位。效益主義一般有所謂的行為效益主義與規則效益主義之區分，如果賦予人享有權利是以規則來表述或規定，那麼，規則效益主義比行為效益主義更適合證成權利的道德地位。這樣的證成當然必須肯定尊重權利的確能帶來一般幸福的增進。這不僅是手段-目的關係的肯定，更需要因果關係之確實性的證據。但，權利之為一般幸福的手段，這需要經驗證據，而這也涉及包障權利所帶來的後果是否就是一般福祉的增進，這是因果關係之經驗問題，效益主義需要提出充分的證據與說明。
3. 混合證成理路
   後果論加入基本權利的說法，這是修正主義，但這樣的修正或許解消原來後果論難以調和權利的難題，所謂弱權利或不穩定權利的難題，但，卻增加理論上其他難題，例如，當違背或取消有些人的基本權利可以更好或是唯一達成（例如）分配平等的目的或結果，當這樣的後果是太被賦予較為優先的地位，理論上意味著，可以或應該犧牲某些人的某些基本權利，如此一來，這些人的基本權利就不是基本權利，而這些人可以是任何人。如此，當任何人的基本權利都可以遭到相同或類似的對待，那麼，所謂的基本權利其實並不具有很重的分量或優先重要性，這回到原來的弱權利與不穩定權利的難題，而且，也使得基本權利的設置終究仍只是工具，本身並無內在規範地位。
6. 做錯事的權利
1. 如果你否定有這樣的權利，那麼，你認定這個對錯的判準或原則有更高的規範地位。如果你肯定有這樣的權利，那麼，至少在有些情況，你擁有的這項權利的規範地位是更高於對錯的原則
2. 如果你有權利做錯事，而且，這個權利是許可權，這意味著，至少在有些情況，你沒有義務不做錯事。可是，一件事是錯的，這提供了很強的理由說明，這事是不應該做的，是有義務不做的。如此，如果你有權利做錯事，那麼，你沒有義務不做你有義務不做的事，這是荒謬的。所以，霍菲爾式的權利概念會否認你有權利做錯事。
   
1. 　有些人支持有權利做錯事的觀念，因為，權利的實質基礎是自主性，只有當一個人有自主性才可能有自由或選擇的能力，一旦，一個人做錯事的權利被否定，這意味著，一個人的自主性也被削弱或限制，這是頗大的規範上的損失。
7. 對於權利主張的外部批評
1. 馬克斯的批評
   馬克思對於權利的批評主要是針對法國與美國革命的價值：財產權、自由權與平等權。馬克思認為，財產權利的享有是個人主義的，財產權的主體享有權利是讓他和社會分立且拉開距離；而自由權利則是使得權利主體成為自私的，因為自由就是不受限制地追求自己慾望的滿足；而平等權利則是形式的，不顧及人與人之間在政治、經濟與社會地位上的實質差距與不平等
2. 社群主義的批評
   社群主義者也認為，權利概念是抽離式的個人主義的，他們批評自由主義者將人當成是獨立於社會而存在的個人來論述個人的權利，古典自由主義者如洛克、盧梭、康德將人看成可以生活在自然狀態 (the state of nature)，當代自由主義者羅爾斯則以原初處境 (the original position)，來描述人在規範上的存在與選擇，但，社群主義者批評，人都活在具體社會中，其中的文化傳統與具體處境是每個人存在與選擇的依憑，而且，人也同時與這些實質的文化傳統與社會具體情況互動而存在並抉擇。社群主義者認為，各種立場的自由主義者則試圖將這些實質且實際的要素框架在權利的概念與主張之中，這是扭曲的。
8. 結語

Democracy－SEP

First published Thu Jul 27, 2006; substantive revision Wed Jul 7, 2021

1. Democracy Defined
1. Four aspects of this definition should be noted
1. democracy concerns collective decision making, by which we mean decisions that are made for groups and are meant to be binding on all the members of the group
2. we intend for this definition to cover many different kinds of groups and decision-making procedures that may be called democratic
3. the definition is not intended to carry any normative weigh
4. the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep
2. The Justification of Democracy
1. Instrumentalism
1. Instrumental arguments in favor of democracy
1. The production of relatively good laws and policies: responsiveness theories
   It is often argued that democratic decision-making best protects subjects’ rights or interests because it is more responsive to their judgments or preferences than competing forms of government
2. The production of relatively good laws and policies: epistemic theories
1. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
   CJT states that, when certain assumptions hold, the probability that a majority of voters support the correct decision increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases
1. The assumptions
1. each voter is more likely than not to identify the correct decision (the competence assumption)
2. voters vote for what they believe is the correct decision (the sincerity assumption)
3. votes are statistically independent of one another (the independence assumption).
2. Critics
1. many have remarked that voters’ opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition building
2. the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways
3. all voters approach issues they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases that undermine the claim that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote
2. the effects of cognitive diversity
   that democratic procedures are best able to exploit the underlying cognitive diversity of large groups of citizens to solve collective problems. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and perspectives in assessing proposed laws and policies
3. information gathering and sharing
   democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms of decision-making about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests
3. Character-based arguments
   some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality, activity, and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule
2. Instrumental arguments against democracy
1. Plato
   argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to the proper governance of societies (Plato 1974, Book VI). Most people do not have the kinds of intellectual talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. But in order to win office or get a piece of legislation passed, politicians must appeal to these people’s sense of what is right or not right. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. Plato argues instead that the state should be ruled by philosopher-kings who have the wisdom and moral character required for good rule
2. Mill 
   Mill defends a form of epistocracy that is sometimes referred to as the “plural voting” scheme (1861: ch. 4). While all rational adults get at least one vote under this scheme, some citizens get a greater number of votes based on satisfying some measure of political expertise
1. the demographic objection
   holds that any criterion of expertise is likely to select demographically homogeneous individuals who are be biased in ways that undermine their ability to produce political outcomes that promote the general welfare
3. Hobbes
   Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects (Hobbes 1651: chap. XIX). On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. As a consequence, citizens’ concerns are not focused on politics and politicians succeed only by making loud and manipulative appeals to citizens in order to gain more power, but all lack incentives to consider views that are genuinely for the common good. Hence the sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes undermines politicians’ concern for the common good and inclines them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens.
4. contemporary empirical data
   shows that citizens of large-scale democracies are ill-informed and apathetic about politics. This makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone
3. Grounds for instrumentalism
1. Pure instrumentalists
   argue that these instrumental arguments for and against the democratic process are the only bases on which to evaluate the justification of democracy or compare it with other forms of political decision-making
2. in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally
   the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process
3. Another sort of argument for instrumentalism proceeds negatively
   attempting to show that the non-instrumental values most commonly used in attempted justifications for democracy do not actually justify democracy, and that an instrumental justification for democracy is therefore the only available sort of justification
4. Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes
1. social choice theory
   questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference
   And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair
2. Ronald Dworkin
   argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality
   the process of democratic deliberation inevitably gives those with superior argument making abilities and greater willingness to participate more influence and therefore more power, than others, so equality of political power cannot be intrinsically fair or just
2. Non-instrumentalism
1. Liberty
1. liberty
   One prominent justification for democracy appeals to the value of liberty. According to one version of the view, democracy is grounded in the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life. Each person’s life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have equal control over this larger environment
2. difficulty
   One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision-making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision
3. irreducibly collective right to self-determination
   One liberty-based argument that might seem to escape this worry appeals to an irreducibly collective right to self-determination. It is often argued that political communities have a right as a community to organize themselves politically in accordance with their values, principles, or commitments. Some argue that the right to collective self-determination requires democratic institutions that give citizens collective control over their political and legal structure
2. Democracy as public justification
1. Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of deliberative democracy 
   Habermas advances a conception of democratic legitimacy according to which law is legitimate only if it results from a free and inclusive democratic process of “opinion and will-formation”. What might such a process look like in a complex and differentiated society? Habermas answers by advancing a “two-track” model that understands democratic legitimation in terms of the relationship between institutionalized deliberative bodies (e.g legislatures, agencies, courts) and informal communication in the public sphere, which is “wild”, and not centrally coordinated.
1. objection
1. free and inclusive democratic procedures are insufficient to satisfy the demand for deliberative consensus embodied in the Democratic Principle. This demand is unlikely to be satisfied in diverse societies, since deep disagreements about which laws ought to be enacted is likely to remain after the relevant process of opinion and will-formation. The Democratic Principle might thus be thought to embody an overly idealistic conception of democratic legitimacy
2. the Discourse Principle is not a genuine moral principle, but a principle that embodies the felicity conditions of practical discourse. As such, the Discourse Principle cannot ground a conception of democratic legitimacy that yields robust moral prescriptions
2. Cohen’s conception of democracy
   The aim of Cohen’s conception of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies.
   For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons
   Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.
3. Equality
   Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way of treating persons as equals when there is good reason to impose some kind of organization on their shared lives but they disagree about how best to do it.
1. An alternative way of justifying democracy on the basis of equality is to ground democracy in public equality. Public equality is a principle of equality which ensures that people can see that they are being treated as equals
1. there is the basic egalitarian idea that people’s interests ought to be equally advanced, or at least that they ought to have equal opportunities to advance them
2. human beings generally have highly fallible and biased understandings of their own and other people’s interests 
3. persons have fundamental interests in being able to see that they are being treated as equals
2. Worry
1. it is generally thought that majority rule is required for treating persons as equals in collective decision making. This is because only majority rule is neutral towards alternatives in decision making. Unanimity tends to favor the status quo as do various forms of supermajority rule. But if this is so, the above view raises the twin dangers of majority tyranny and of persistent minorities, i.e., groups of persons who find themselves always losing in majority decisions. 
2.  the kind of view defended above is susceptible to the worry that political equality is not a coherent ideal in any modern state with a complex division of labor and the need for representation
3. Niko Kolodny
   Niko Kolodny argues that democratic institutions are an essential component of relational equality (Kolodny 2014a,b). One line of Kolodny’s argument holds that political decisions involve the use of coercive force. Inequalities in the power to use force undermine equal social status at least in part because the power to use force is “the power that usually determines the distribution of other powers” (Kolodny 2014b: 307). Individuals who have superior power to use force on others have a superior social status. An egalitarian distribution of political power is thus essential for realizing social equality. And only democratic institutions provide an egalitarian distribution of political power
3. The Authority of Democracy
1. legitimate authority of the state
1. if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority
2.  a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey
3. the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens’ duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state
2. Instrumentalist Conceptions of Democratic Authority
1. David Estlund
   argues that democratic procedures have legitimate authority because they are better than random and epistemically the best of the political systems that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens (Estlund 2008). They must be better than random because, otherwise, why wouldn’t we use a fair random procedure like a lottery or coin flip? Democratic authority must have an epistemic element. And the justification of democratic procedure must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to respect their freedom and equality. Estlund’s conception of democratic authority—which he calls “epistemic proceduralism”— thus combines the ideal of public justification with a concern for the tendency of democracies to produce good decisions.
3. Intrinsic Conceptions of Democratic Authority
1. Democracy as collective self-rule
1. Locke
   Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals who consent to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and taxes levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of property
2. Rousseau
   Rousseau argues that when individuals consent to form a political community, they agree to put themselves under the direction of the “general will” (Rousseau 1762). The general will is not a mere aggregation of individuals’ private wills. It is, rather, the will of the political community as a whole. And since the general will can only emerge as the product of a properly organized democratic procedure, individuals consent to put themselves under the direction of a properly organized democratic procedure
1. democratic procedures
   On one interpretation of Rousseau, democratic procedures are properly organized only when they (1) define rights that apply equally to all, (2) via a procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally, and (3) everyone who is coerced to obey the laws has a voice in that procedure.
2. general will
   
1. the constitutive interpretation
   On what might be called the constitutive interpretation, the general will is constituted by the results of a properly organized democratic procedure. That is, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the general will in virtue of the fact that they emerge from a properly organized democratic procedure, and not because they reflect some procedure-independent truth about the common good
2. the epistemic interpretation
   On what might be called the epistemic interpretation, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the way of tracking the procedure-independent truth about the common good
2. Freedom and democratic authority
1. Anna Stilz
   Anna Stilz develops an account of democratic authority that appeals to the value of “freedom as independence” (Stilz 2009). Freedom as independence is freedom from being subject to the will of another. In order not to be subject to the will of others, individuals need property rights and a protected sphere of autonomy to pursue one’s plans
   
   Stilz argues that justice must be administered by an authoritative legal system which can coercively impose one set of objective rules—rules we must respect even when we disagree—to adjudicate our conflicting claims. But if such a system is to be consistent with the freedom of subjects, it cannot be imposed by the private wills of rulers. The solution, Stilz argues, lies in Rousseau’s idea of the general will. When subjects obey the general will, they are not obeying the private will of any individual; they are obeying a will that arises from all and applies to all
3. Equality and authority
1. Daniel Viehoff 
   Viehoff argues that relational equality is threatened by “subjection” in a relationship, which occurs when individuals have significantly different power over how they interact with and relate to one another.
   According to Viehoff, obeying the outcomes of egalitarian democratic procedures is necessary and sufficient for citizens to achieve coordination on common rules without subjection. It is sufficient because democratic procedures distribute decision-making power equally, which ensures that coordination is not determined by unequal power advantages. It is necessary because parties must set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power to realize non-subjection in their relationship.
2. Fabienne Peter
   Peter’s “pure epistemic proceduralism” holds that suitably egalitarian democratic decisions are binding at least in part because they result from a fair procedure of knowledge-production. This account differs from Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism because it does not condition the authority of democratic procedures on their ability to produce decisions that track the procedure-independent truth. Rather, the authority of democratic procedures is grounded in their fairness. And it differs from pure procedural accounts because the relevant notion of fairness is fairness in knowledge-production
4. Limits to the Authority of Democracy
1. We can distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority. 
1. An internal limit
   arises from the constitutive requirements of the democratic process or from the principles that ground democracy. 
2. An external limit arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements that ground democracy.
2. Internal limits to democratic authority
1. consent-Locke
   Locke gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent (Locke 1690: ch. XI). She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal rights
2. self-government-Ronald Dworkin
   He argues that self-government cannot be realized unless all citizens are treated as full members of the political community, because, otherwise, they are not able to identify as members of the community. Among the conditions of full membership, he argues, are rights to be treated as equals and rights to have one’s moral independence respected. These principles support robust requirements of non-discrimination and of basic liberal rights.
3. public equality
   Since democracy is founded in public equality, it may not violate public equality in any of its decisions. The basic idea is that overt violation of public equality by a democratic assembly undermines the claim that the democratic assembly embodies public equality. Democracy’s embodiment of public equality is conditional on its protecting public equality.
3. The problem of persistent minorities
   In effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.
4. External limits to democratic authority
   One natural kind of limit to democratic authority is the external kind of limit. Here the idea is that there are certain considerations that favor democratic decision making and there are certain values that are independent of democracy that may be at issue in democratic decisions. For example, many theories recognize core liberal rights—such as rights to property, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought and expression—as external limits to democratic authority. Locke is often interpreted as arguing that individuals have natural rights to property in themselves and the external world that democratic laws must respect in order to have legitimate authorit
4. The Demands of Democratic Participation
1. The Problem of Democratic Participation
1. Problem
1. First, Plato argued that some people are more intelligent and informed about political matters than others and have a superior moral character, and that those persons ought to rule
2. Second, others have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves intelligently to politics?
3. since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that an individual’s vote will a decide the outcome of an election (i.e., will determine whether a candidate gets elected or not) are nearly indistinguishable from zero.
1.  Anthony Downs
   Anthony Downs has argued that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote (Downs 1957: ch.13). On the assumption that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes made
2. Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Democratic Participation
1. Elite theory of democracy
   Some modern theorists of democracy, called elite theorists, have argued against any robustly egalitarian or deliberative forms of democracy in light of the problem of democratic participation. They argue that high levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad legislation designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged uninformedness of citizens evidenced in many empirical studies in the 1950s and 1960s as perfectly reasonable and predictable. Indeed they regard the alleged apathy of citizens in modern states as highly desirable social phenomena.
2. Interest group pluralism
   In this conception of the democratic process, each citizen is a member of an interest group with narrowly defined interests that are closely connected to their everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are supposed to be quite well informed and interested in having an influence. Or at least, elites from each of the interest groups that are relatively close in perspective to the ordinary members are the principal agents in the process. On this account, democracy is not rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities. Policy and law in a democratic society are decided by means of bargaining among the different groups.
3. Neo-liberalism
   A third approach inspired by the problem of participation may be called the neo-liberal approach to politics favored by public choice theorists such as James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock (1962)
   Neo-liberals infer that one ought to transfer many of the current functions of the state to the market and limit the state to the enforcement of basic property rights and liberties. These can be more easily understood and brought under the control of ordinary citizens.
1. Worry
1. citizens in modern societies have more ambitious conceptions of social justice and the common good than are realizable by the minimal state. The neo-liberal account thus implies a very serious curtailment of democracy of its own. More evidence is needed to support the contention that these aspirations cannot be achieved by the modern state
2. the neo-liberal approach ignores the problem of large private concentrations of wealth and power that are capable of pushing small states around for their own benefit and imposing their wills on populations without their consent
4. The self-interest assumption
   A considerable amount of the literature in political science and the economic theory of the state are grounded in the assumption that individuals act primarily and perhaps even exclusively in their self-interest narrowly construed. The problem of participation and the accounts of the democratic process described above are in large part dependent on this assumption. When the preferences of voters are not assumed to be self-interested the calculations of the value of participation change. 
5. The Division of Democratic Labor
1. what is the appropriate role for a citizen in this division of labor? 
   The rationale for this division of labor is that expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the development of legislation and policy. Citizens are capable in their everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of values and of their interests. And if citizens genuinely do choose the aims and others faithfully pursue the means to achieving those aims, then citizens are in the driver’s seat in society and they can play this role as equals.
2.  Citizens save time by making use of institutions such as the press, unions and other interest group associations, political parties, and opinion leaders to get information about politics. They also rely on interactions in the workplace as well as conversations with friends and families. Political parties can connect ordinary citizens in various ways to expertise because each one contains a division of labor within them that mirrors that in the state. Experts in parties have incentives to make their expertise intelligible to other members (Christiano 2012). In addition, under favorable conditions, political parties stimulate the development of citizens’ normative perspectives and facilitate a healthy public competition of political justifications based on those perspectives
3. The Moral Duties of Democratic Citizens
1. The Duty to Vote
1. Parfit -act-utilitarian
   Act-utilitarians hold that morally right actions maximize the total expected sum of the utilities of all persons in the society. Parfit argues that voting might nonetheless maximize expected utility if one candidate is significantly superior to the other(s). If we add the benefits to each member of the society of having the superior candidate win, we get a very large difference in value
1. Jason Brennan - the particularity problem
   This is the problem of explaining why citizens ought to promote value through political participation as opposed to through non-political acts. Voting is just one way of promoting overall utility; we need to know the expected utility of the different acts they might perform instead. Even if the argument above is correct, it might be the case that many individuals maximize expected utility by not voting and doing something even more beneficial with their time.
2. Alex Guerrero
    argues that citizens have moral reasons to vote because candidates who win by a larger proportion of votes can claim a greater “normative mandate” to govern
3. Beerbohm 2012; Zakaras 2018
   Some theorists argue that individuals have a moral duty to vote in order to absolve themselves of complicity in state injustices
   citizens of large-scale democracies have a kind of standing responsibility, by paying taxes and obeying laws, for their state’s injustices of which they must actively absolve themselves The complicity account argues that citizens avoid shared responsibility for their state’s injustices if they oppose those injustices through voting and of public advocacy
1. Worry
1.  it is unclear why voting and publicly advocating against injustice should be thought to absolve responsibility that is established by paying taxes and obeying laws
2.  one’s concern to oppose injustice should derive from a more direct concern for the wrongs suffered by victims of injustice rather than a concern with keeping one’s hands clean.
2. Principled Disobedience of the Law
1. Civil disobedience
   According to the standard view, civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law that aims to change laws or government policies. People who engage in civil disobedience are willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions in order to show fidelity to the law 
1. Rawls argues
   Rawls argues that while citizens of a “nearly just” society have a pro tanto duty to obey its laws in virtue of it being nearly just, civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant society more just
2. Simmons 
   if there is no general duty to obey the law, there would seem to be no presumption in favor of obedience and thus no special need for a justification of civil disobedience; obedience and disobedience would stand equally in need of justification
5. Democratic Representation
1. What Sort of Representative System is Best?
1. Single member district representation
   Single member district representation returns single representatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations to the legislature
1. moderation and compromise
   Charles Beitz argues that single member district representation encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to consider (Beitz 1989: ch. 7). This results from the tendency of this kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading parties
2. underrepresented
   representatives of minority interests and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and interests are often systematically underrepresented
2. party list proportional representation
   In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a whole
1. proportional representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart rather quickly
2. Minorities
   Minorities need not make their demands conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that characterize single member district systems so their views are more articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.
3. Group representation
   Group representation occurs when the society is divided into non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.
   
   Marion Young argued that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very well under proportional representation (Young 1990: ch. 6). They may not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.
   
   One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens
2. The Ethics of Representation
1. Hannah Pitkin’s famous distinction between trustees and delegates
1. trustees
   Representatives who act as trustees rely on their own independent judgments in carrying out their duties. Norms of trusteeship are supported in recognition that, given a natural division of democratic labor, officials are in a much better position to make well-reasoned and well-informed political decisions than ordinary citizens.
2. delegates
   Representatives who act as delegates defer to the judgments of their citizens. These norms might be thought to reflect the value of democratic accountability. Because the people authorize representatives to govern, it is natural to think that representatives are accountable to the people to enact their judgments.
6. Social Choice and Democracy
1. Kenneth Arrow
   Arrow shows that a social choice function that satisfies a number of plausible constraints cannot be defined when there are three or more alternatives to be chosen by the group. He lays out a number of conditions to be imposed on a social choice function
1. Unlimited domain:
   The social choice function must be able to give us a social preference no matter what the preferences of the individuals over alternatives are. 
2. Non dictatorship: the social choice function must not select the preference of one particular member regardless of others’ preferences. 
3. Transitivity and completeness: The individual preferences orderings must be transitive and complete orderings and the social preference derived from them must be transitive and complete. 
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: the social preference between two alternatives must be the result only of the individual orderings between those two alternatives. 
5. Pareto condition: if all the members prefer an alternative x over y, then x must be ranked above y in the social preference
2. Condorcet rule
   Condorcet rule says that an alternative x wins when, for every other alternative, a majority prefers x over that alternative
1. Riker
   Riker argues that the theorem shows that the idea that the popular will can be the governing element in a society is false. If an existence condition for a popular will is a restricted set of preferences the question naturally arises as to whether such a condition is always or normally met in a moderately complex society. We might wonder whether a highly pluralistic society with a very complex division of labor is likely to satisfy the restricted preference set condition necessary to avoid cycles or other pathologies of social choice
2. Sean Ingham
   The idea is that majorities have equal control over policy areas when they are able to get what they want with the same amount of intensity of preferences. And equality holds generally when all groups of the same size have the same control (Ingham 2019). There remains an extreme case in which all majorities have equal intensity of preference and are caught in a majority cycle. But the chances of this happening are very slim, even if the chances of majority cycles more generally are not as small. Even if there are a lot of majority cycles, if the issues are resolved in such a way that those majorities that have most at stake in the conflict are the ones that get their way, then we can have fairness in a quite robust sense even while having pervasive majority cycles
7. The Boundary Problem: Constituting the Demos
1. Is there a democratic solution to the boundary problem
1. The first idea is that the people ought to decide what the boundaries are
2. A second theoretical solution that has some democratic credentials is to invoke the principle that all who are subjected to decision making, in the sense of who are coerced or have duties imposed upon them, ought to have a say in the decision making
3. A third proposed theoretical solution is the all-affected principle. One formulation is “all affected persons ought to have a say in the decisions that affect them”. This does suggest that when the activities in one state affect those of another state, the people of the other state ought to have a say in those activities
   
   But the all-affected principle is conceptually quite uncertain and morally deeply problematic, and it provides very little, if anything, in the way of a solution to the boundary problem
1. “having a say” is not clear.
   Does it require having a vote in collective decision-making? Or is it also satisfied by a person’s being able to modify another’s action by negotiating with them, as we see when there is bargaining over an externality? This latter version would undermine the idea that the all-affected principle has direct implications for the boundary problem
2. it is not clear what “being affected” means
1. does a person being affected just mean that there is a change in the person’s situation or must the effect involve the setting back of one’s preferences, or interests, or legitimate interests, or exercise of one’s capacities or one’s good
2. are one’s interests affected by a decision only when they are advanced or set back relative to some baseline (either the present state of affairs or some morally defined baseline like what you have promised me), or am I affected by decisions that could be to my advantage or disadvantage but end up making no difference?